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ABSTRACT
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Canada and Japan contrast significantly in many respects. 
Geographically» Canada occupies the northern part of North Anerica— vast 
in land area and rich in natural resources. Japan, on the other hand, forms 
a small chain of islands off the Asian continent. Its resources are found 
in a large population and a rapidly growing industrial strength substanti­
ated by its high GNP.
Socio-culturally, Canada’s heritage is mainly a mixture of French 
and English. Presently, it is greatly influenced by the Anerican culture. 
Japan contrasts with a culture all its own, which has so far withstood 
attacks of Americanization.
Important differences can also be found in the foreign and defence 
policy-making processes of the two countries. The comparative study of 
the functions of their decision-makers shows great contrast in the senior 
officialdom, the Prime Ministership, the Cabinet, as well as the opposition 
of both countries, in spite of the fact they share a similar Parliamentary 
system.
Although there are these differences, Canada and Japan share in 
military relations with the U.S.— Canada in NATO and NORAD, and Japan in 
the Security Treaty. Careful comparative examination, however, reveals 
some striking differences. Most significant is the divergence in the 
development of their military dependence on the U.S. in the postwar period. 
Canada’s defence has become greatly integrated with the U.S., whereas 
Japan has shown a tendency towards gradual reduction of its dependence.
To a certain extent, this divergence in their military dependence 
can be related to their differences in the policy-making process. This 
divergence can be related more to the differences existing in geographical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Vand socio-cultural aspects of the two countries. In Canada*s case, 
heavier military dependence on the U.S. is explained by its convergence 
with the U.S. in geography, society and culture. Japan*s divergence 
with the U.S. in these respects accounts for its trend to lesser 
dependence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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INTRODUCTION
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2Japan and Canada are two middle powers across the Pacific Ocean 
from each other, differing entirely in geography, language, culture and 
history. Canada, before Confederation in 1867, was a British colony.
Even today Canada still retains a close relationship with Britain. The 
French occupied Canada before it became a British colony. As a result, 
French Canadians comprise one-third of the present total population. 
Canada, thus, possesses a unique mixture of mainly British and French 
cultures.
Canadian cultural characteristics are not only British and 
French, but also American. Neighbouring on the U.S., Canada is, to a 
large extent, influenced by the Americans socio-culturally, economically 
and politically as well. In the postwar period, in particular, the influ­
ence of the U.S. on Canada has become so great that some Canadians today 
have difficulty in differentiating themselves from Americans in terms of 
political, economic, cultural and military aspects.
Historically, Canada has never enjoyed a fully independent 
identity. "Rather," writes Roger Swanson, "it invoked the counterweight
technique of balancing external influences so that it could develop as
1
an autonomous nation." When Great Britain proposed an imperial defence 
federation in the 1870’s, Canada invoked the United States to balance 
Great Britain. In the postwar period, this technique of balancing 
external influences has been used to create a counterweight to U.S. 
military, economic, cultural and political pressures.
In this respect, Canada presents a great contrast to Japan.
Japan is an Asian country, unique in that it is considered too Westernized 
to be entirely Asian, and too Asian to be considered Western. Bounded on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3all sides by the sea, Japan had seldom experienced a threat to its 
territorial integrity until the Second World War. Its geographical 
isolation contributed to its cultural and political isolation until 
the Heiji Restoration in 1868. Unlike Canada, Japan does not have 
the difficulty of differentiating itself from other countries in 
socio-cultural aspects.
Though Canada and Japan contrast in many respects, they also 
share some similarities. Not only are both allies of the Western power 
bloc led by the U.S. and classified as'middle powers, but they also 
both share in military co-operation with the U.S. Anong the bilateral 
military agreements of the U.S., the North American Air Defence (NORAD) 
system between the U.S. and Canada, and the Security Treaty system 
between the U.S. and Japan are most important in U.S. defence policy.
As partners in such important bilateral military alliances with the 
U.S., Canada and Japan have kept, throughout the postwar period, a 
relatively close relationship-with the U.S., economically, politically, 
as well as militarily.
Taking this into consideration, it is noteworthy to compare how 
Canada and Japan— two very different countries in many respects— have 
developed their military relations with the U.S. in this period. 
Comparative analysis of the development of their military relations with 
the U.S. will draw attention to some important bases from which Canada 
and Japan may possibly promote their co-operation in the future.
This paper attempts to analyze comparatively, in three parts, 
the postwar development in the military relations of Canada and Japan 
with the U.S. The purpose of taking this approach of comparative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4analysis is to help account for the similarities and differences between 
the two countries in their defence policies.
Part I makes a comparative study of geographical, economic and
socio-cultural factors in the relations of Canada and Japan with the 
U.S. Comparison of their respective public attitudes towards the U.S., 
on the basis of the public opinion poll results, will reveal a divergence 
and convergence existing in their relations with the U.S. Salient inter­
national environments of the postwar period and national interests and
policy objectives of the two countries are also dealt with and compared 
in this part.
Part II analyzes, comparatively, the policy-making processes of 
Canada and Japan, with emphasis on foreign and defence policies. First, 
structural and functional differences between the Department of External 
Affairs in relation to the Department of National Defence and the ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in relation to the National Defence Agency are examined. 
Next, the differences in background characteristics of senior officials in 
both the Department of External Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
are pointed out. In the following sections, the Prime Minister, the 
Cabinet, and the people and opposition parties are comparatively dealt with.
Part III examines how the governments, the oppositions and the 
people of these two countries have reacted to the development in their 
military relations with the U.S., during the postwar period. This part 
divides the postwar period into three, focusing attention on the conclu­
sion and renewal of NATO, KORAD and the Security Treaty. The coursesof 
action taken by the government and the reaction to them of the opposition 
and the people in both countries are compared in each period.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5The conclusion attempts to relate this divergence and convergence 
betxreen Canada and Japan, in terms of geography, economy, society, culture 
and the policy-making process, to the postwar development of their military 
relations with the U.S. In doing so, the conclusion aims at discovering 
xdiat is the most important factor determining the similarities or differ­
ences in the military relations of Canada and Japan with the U.S.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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6Strategic Location
Geographical location and sice have been among the most important
factors shaping the defence policy of a country, and they continue to be
of great importance in the Canadian case.
The land area of Canada extends from the Atlantic to the Pacific,
covering the northern part of the North American continent. Canada’s
total area of four million square miles is the largest in the Western
Hemisphere and second only to the Soviet Union, in the world. Bordered
only by the U.S. to the south and north-west, Canada was remote from
possible enemies of conventional war. Since the ICBH era, which began in
the late Fifties, Canada’s geographical advantages— vastness and remote^
ness— have become greatly reduced. Situated between the superpowers,
Canada is now a possible area for a nuclear battlefield.
National security nay include not only considerations of terri-
2
torial integrity, but also of survival of national identity. In consider­
ing "survival of national identity," which is widely discussed in Canada 
today, it may be viewed that the U.S. constitutes a threat to Canada. 
However, -with reference to "territorial integrity," since the end of the 
Second Uorld T7ar, the Soviet Union has been considered by military 
planners to be Canada’s only possible enemy, and the direction of its 
threat has been over the North Pole.
Located on the other side of the Pacific, Japan is only one
twenty-eighth the sine of Canada, which means it is approximately one
3
quarter the size of Quebec or the same size as Newfoundland. Although 
Japan is an island country surrounded by the Pacific Ocean to the east 
and the Sea of Japan to the west, the archipelago of 3,513 islands is
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
nore vulnerable to military attach— from the continent and fron 
submarines. Especially since its two currently possible enemies, the 
Soviet Union and Communist China, are located directly across the Sea 
of Japan, its location is inevitably disadvantageous compared to Canada’ 
location.
This divergence between Canada and Japan is even greater, when
the population of the two countries is taken into consideration. Japan*
population is five tines as large as that of Canada. Of the 100 million
Japanese, more than one-third are crowded into the narrow belt along the
Pacific coast, from Tokyo in the north to Kita-Kyushu in the south. The
4
population density of Japan is 130 tines larger than that of Canada.
5 '
The size, the length of coast line, and the snail population 
make Canada difficult and costly to defend. But Japan, whose huge 
population is crowded into such a small area, appears unavoidably open 
to possibility of total destruction through nuclear attack.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8Economic Relations with the U»S. after World Uar II
Canada is not only great in land area, but also in abundance of
natural resources. The mineral production of Canada, which accounted
for $500 million in 1945, has rapidly increased to $1 billion in 1950
6
and $4 billion in 1966. Bountiful natural resources from coal and 
petroleum to nickel and uranium lie under the relatively virgin land 
of Canada; only part of which has yet been exploited.
Japan, contrary to the Canadian situation, is rather limited 
in natural resources, particularly in mineral resources, which are vital 
to defence production. Iron ore, crude petroleum and nickel ore, which 
are important not only for military purposes, but also for modern indus­
try, as a whole, are desperately in need.
Abundant in natural resources, the Canadian economy is much less 
agriculture-based than that of Japan. In Canada, approximately 90 per 
cent of the labour force is engaged in secondary and tertiary industries, 
while in 1967, 7.6 per cent was engaged in agriculture and 3.0 per cent 
in other primary industries. In Japan, over 20 per cent of the total 
labour force is still engaged in agriculture and approximately 25 per cent 
in primary industries.
The differences in economy between Canada and Japan, however, 
are not only found in economic structure, but also in per capita income. 
Although Japan*s GNP in 1968 was more than twice that of Canada, per 
capita income of Japan in the same year was less than half ($1,110) of 
the Canadian counterpart ($2,300). The rate of increase in Japan*s per 
capita income, like that of its GIHi has been much faster than that of 
Canada, but it will still take Japan a while to bring its standard of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 1 .
Production of Hineral Resources in Canada and Japan
(1960-1568)
in thousands of metric tons
Iron Ore Copper
Year Uorld Canada Japan Uorld Canada Japan
196u 256,600 11,140 1,774 4,270 395.5 89.2
1961 246,100 10,528 1,594 4,430 398.3 96.4
1962 252,300 14,148 1,442 4,630 414.9 103.6
1963 266,700 16,150 1,363 4,650 410.6 107.2
196 a 301, 100 20,766 1,432 4,840 441.7 106.2
1965 326,400 21,822 1,427 5,050 460.9 107.1
1966 339,900 22,474 1,370 5,270 459.1 111.7
1967 337,800 23,433 1, 274 5,020 556.4 117.8
1968 368,100 27,349 1, 249 5,390 562.4 119.9
Nickel Ore Zinc
Year world Canada Japan Uorld Canada Jap an
1960 337,000 194,597 — 3,380 390.1 156.7
1961 374,000 211,366 - - 3,500 402.0 168.3
1962 367,000 210,686 - - 3,640 455.4 192.5
1963 358,000 196,886 — 3,680 451.0 198.0
1964 395,000 207,288 — 4,070 662.2 216.5
1965. 458,000 235, 126 - - 4,360 826.4 • 221.0
1966 438,000 202,856 - - 4,520 949.8 253.6
196/ 513,000 225,569 — 4,900 1,133.1 262.7
196d 570,000 239,359 — 5,070 1,155.1 264.3
Crude Petroleum Lead Ore
Year Uorld Canada Japan Uorld Canada Jap an
1960 1,053,600 25,630 526 2,430 192.5 39.5
1961 1, 122,200 29,863 657 2,420 165.6 46.3
1962 1,217,200 33,020 760 2,540 191.7 53.5
1963 1,305,800 34,845 785 2,540 180.5 52.7
1964 1,409,700 37,147 657 2,570 187.2 54.1
1965 1,510,700 39, 457 671 2,750 274.8 54.9
1966 1,641,600 43,248 782 2,860 283.2 63.1
1967 1,760,100 47,394 788 2,900 308.2 63.5
1968 1,923,800 51,197 782 3,000 327.6 62.9
Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook 1969, Statistical Office* Departmen 
of Economics and Social Affairs* the United Nations* New York
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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living up to the Canadian one.
Economic divergence between the two countries is also found in 
their postwar economic relations with the U.S. Throughout the postwar 
period to the present, Canada has relied on the U.S. for approximately 
60 per cent of its exports and 70 per cent of its imports.
Before Japan’s independence in 1951, its trade with the U.S. 
was very unbalanced; 66 per cent of its imports and only 18 per cent of 
its exports (the average of the four-year period 1947-1950) were with the 
U.S. After the Occupation ended, the American share in Japan’s exports 
showed a drastic increase— 14 per cent in 1951 and 32 per cent in 1968.
At the sane time, Japan has gradually decreased the proportion of its
7
imports from the U.S. from 29 per cent in 1951 to 23 per cent in 1968.
Canadian trade with the U.S., as a rule, has been to the 
advantage of the U.S., imports exceeding exports by about 10 per cent.
In 1968, however, Canada’s exports to the U.S. for the first time 
exceeded its imports from that country, lloreover, since 1961, Canada’s 
world exports have exceeded its world imports.
In contrast to Canada’s case, Japan, with exception of a few 
years, has always imported more than it exported in total foreign trade. 
But, as far as its trade with, the U.S. is concerned, exports since 1965 
have exceeded imports.
Furthermore, while Canada leaves little more than one-third of 
its foreign trade for the rest of the world, Japan divides the remain­
ing 66 per cent of its foreign trade between the Asian market and the 
rest of the world. One of Canada’s ’’mother countries,” Great Britain, 
has remained its second largest trading partner, but its share has been
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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reduced. France is far below Britain on the list of Canada’s leading 
8
trading partners. Canada’s trade with European countries* including
the Soviet Union (2 per cent), occupied less than 20 per cent of the
total in 1966 (24 per cent in exports and .15 per cent in imports), when
the .American share was 65 per cent. The remaining 15 ner cent was
9
shared by various countries in the world.
Compared with the U.S. nahing up most of Canada’s market, in
1967, all Asian countries, including those in the Middle East and in the
Communist bloc, shared over one-third of the Japanese foreign trade;
34 per cent in exports and 31 per cent in imports. The rest of the
world occupied another one-third; 15 per cent with Europe, 7 per cent
with Africa, 6 per cent with Oceania, and 4 per cent with the others.
In the period 1950-1968, Japan’s expansion in trade was much
greater than that of Canada, although Canada’s total foreign trade
exceeded that of Japan until as recently as 1964. However, dependence
on foreign trade is heavier in Canada’s case than in Japan’s. This
can be derived from viewing total foreign trade as a percentage of
GUP figures. (Table 3) In 1968, for example, Canada’s foreign trade
amounted to almost forty per cent of GHP, while the equivalent amount for
Japan was 20 per cent of the GUP. This indicates that the /merican
market is vital for Canada, while it is much less so for Japan.
Foreign investment by the U.S. is another important factor.in
the economic relations of Canada and Japan. According to the Batkins
report of 1968 on foreign investment, the Americans control 46 per cent
of manufacturing, 62 per cent of the petroleum and natural gas industry,
10
and 52 per cent of mining and smelting in Canada. Foreigners, mainly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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■Americans, control 97 per cent of Canada*s automobile industry, 97 per
cent of the rubber, 78 per cent of the chemical and 77 per cent of the
11
electric apparatus.
TABLE 3.
Comparison of GNP and Foreign Trade, 1950-1968
in millions of U.S. dollars
CANADA JAPAN
Year GNP (A) Foreign Trade (B) B/A GNP (A) Foreign Trade (3) B/A
1950 16,500 5,800 35% 11,100 1,800 16%
1952 22,400 8,400 38 16,900 3,300 20
1954 23,100 8,100 35 20,700 4,000 19
1956 28,400 10,600 37 25,800 5,700 22
1958 30,700 10,300 33 34,900 5,900 - 17
1960 33,700 11,200 33 49,300 8,500 17
1962 37,700 11,800 31 62,400 10,600 17
1964 44,100 14,600 33 77,200 14,600 19
1966 53,700 18,900 35 97,600 19,300 20
1968 62,500 24,000 38 142,000 26,000 18
Note: Figures are calculated on a U.S. dollar base equivalent to Canadian 
$1.07 and Japanese ¥360, regardless of fluctuation.
Source: Canada Year Bool:, Nihon Tolcei Nenkan and The llilitary Balance,
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.
The total foreign long-terra capital invested in Canada increased 
from Can. $8,661 million in 1950 to Can. $32,012 million in 1966, of 
which the U.S. share rose from Can. $6,548 million in 1950 to Can. $25,644 
million in 1966. Throughout this period, the U.S. has been Canada*s 
biggest investor, holding an annual average of 77 per cent of total 
investments.
Compared with Canada, the capital inflow of Japan has at least
two very significant characteristics: one is the small scale of foreign
investments, which totalled $848 million in 1967; the other is the very
12
limited participation in management by foreigners. The small scale of
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investment and management participation strictly limits the possibility 
of foreign intervention in Japanese industries.
In 1967, the foreign direct investments x;ere $30 million, a 
figure undeniably smaller than the $1,925 million in Canada. Although 
more than 70 per cent of the foreign investments in Japan have been from 
the U.S., Japan has successfully maintained its independence from 
American control over the economy.
Because of the dominance of the U.S. in its economic relations, 
it is not difficult to understand why Canada, compared mith Japan, must 
rely much more on the U.S. for its military production. In view of the 
differences in geographical and socio-cultural as well as economic 
aspects, Canadafs heavy economic dependence on the U.S. is likely to 
continue, uhile Japan mill probably further reduce its reliance upon the 
U.S., expanding its market in Asia.
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Socio-Cultural Aspects
In Japan’s case, geographical and demographic factors not only
give rise to certain weaknesses, but also, when fused with socio-cultural
factors, to certain strengths: the asset of a high degree of national
unity. The insular, homogeneous population of Japan has preserved its
own culture through its history- Sooted in this culture, the Japanese
people are far more tightly unified than Canadians. The extent of
national unification may bear considerable relation to the defence and
foreign policies in Japan’s postwar period.
In Canada there is a great variety of ethnic groups and relicions,
13
while in Japan, there are hardly any. The Canadian people are divided
mainly into two ethnic groups— those of British origin (447.,) and those
of French origii^  (307o). The rest are Germans (5.87)> Ukrainians (2-67,)>
14
Italians (2.57,)> Dutch (2-4%) and more than thirty other small groups-
Because of pressure from the second largest grouo, the Canadian
15
Government has attempted to promote biculturalism and bilingualism. 
However, because of its French-Caiiadian heritage, the province of Quebec 
is often alienated from the rest of the provinces where there is an 
English-speaking majority. Uhile the economic interests of the poor 
maritime provinces are often in conflict with those of the rich pro­
vinces, the western provinces are geographically isolated from the 
eastern provinces.
This lack of national unification in Canada may also be related 
to the convergence which exists in culture, language and perhaps ideology 
between the U.S. and Canada. The pulls exerted by the great industrial 
power of the U.S. have worked in favour of a north-south mentality in
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Canada, rather than an east-west one. Canadians seem to have made little 
effort to preserve their separate national identity, acquiescing in the 
maintenance of a cultural, economic and military "togetherness” with the 
U.S. In this respect, Canada has been drawn towards continentalism 
rather than towards Canadian nationalism.
In terms of Japan's defence policy, a strong sense of nationalism 
has been an undeniable supporter of the desire for increased independence 
from the U.S. Contrary to Japan, Canada does not yet seem instilled with 
the kind of strong nationalism which would make it refuse foreign control 
of its military operation, although Canadian attitudes clearly have 
changed in the last year or so.
16
In earlier history, Canada regarded the U.S. as an enemy. One 
of the reasons for Confederation in 1867 was Canada's fear of being a 
victim of conquest by the U.S. Because of the military threat from the 
south and Great Britain's attempts to centralize its imperial defence
17
with the strategic withdrawal of colonial garrisons, Canadians, as a
whole, became firmly unified and gradually, after Confederation, Canada
expanded its borders from the Atlantic to the Pacific.
Internally, however, the French Canadians developed a "state-of-
siege mentality," after having been continuously dominated by the English.
Mason Wade believes that the French Canadians are reminded, even today,
that "they are a conquered people" and that "the 'English," whether
English-Canadian or American, are heriditary enemies who still seek to
18
anglicize and Protestantize."
In spite of the existence of the French-Canadian antagonism to 
Americans, Canada, as a whole, began to move out of the British orbit
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into the American one by the end of the First Uorld Uar. This was 
accompanied by a great increase in American investment in Canada, con-
19
pared to British investment which remained stable. Friendlier relations 
between the U.S. and Canada were also effected, when Canada co-operated 
with the U.S. in the Second Nor Id war, after they created a Permanent 
Joint Board on Defence in 1940 through the Ogdensburg Agreement.
Joint efforts with the U.S. and Britain in the war economy 
brought about a spectacular development of Canadian industry and 
agriculture. After the Uar, however, Canadians came to realize the danger 
of excessive dependence on the U.S. militarily, economically and poli­
tically. To counterbalance U.S. influence, Canada quickly launched a 
determined effort to develop multiplicity of relationships through the 
United Nations, the North Atlantic community and the Commonwealth 
organization.
Unlike Canada, Japan had experienced a long period of isolation 
from the outside world for about 300 years until 1854. After opening its 
doors to the Uest, Japan commenced modernization, stimulated by modern 
Uestem technology. At the same time, Japan had unequal treaties with 
the strong Uestern countries forced upon it. The modernization or 
westernization period which took place after the Neiji Restoration shows 
some similarities with the early postwar period of Japan: acceptance of
unequal treaties; heavy dependence on Uestern countries (the U.S. in 
particular); blind admiration of the western (American) culture; and 
concentration on establishing a strong economic power.
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Japanese people 
had gradually become sepai'ated from the "powerful" Uestern countries and
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had developed a high level of industrialization. It might have been 
that the Japanese were consciously trying to overcome a sense of infer­
iority that had been instilled in them by the phrase "renlica of the 
20
Uest." They went on to assume an aggressive spirit with strong over­
tones of militant nationalism, and what they had built up in the fifty 
years following the Restoration, collapsed at the end of T.'orld Uar II.
In the early postwar period, in contrast with Canada, Japan was
obliged to rely completely on the U.S. It had to, in order to regain
its economic power. As if "war made the U.S. and Japan friends," the
U.S. took over the position that China held when Japan borrowed from
it political and cultural ideas in the early period of its history.
Accompanying this process of borrowing, the Japanese people seem to
have felt, during the Occupation (1945-1951), some barrier which they had
to surmount. Although the Americans embarked on the Occupation with
much "flexibility" and broad "tolerance," they cane with litt_e knowledge
of Japan*s culture, history and tradition, but with great ambitions to
21
enact another "Kew Deal" in Japan. This socio-cultural barrier between 
the Japanese and Americans may be compared to what separates the French 
Canadians from "les anglais"— a sense of inferiority and a feeling of 
alienation in culture, history and language.
The divergence in socio-cultural relationships with the U.S. indi­
cates the difference in what constitutes an acceptable degree of military 
dependence in the long term. Canadians have much more in common with 
Americans in culture and language than have the Japanese people. This 
factor seems to permit a higher Canadian tolerance level of U.S. military 
dominance, than the tolerance level of Japan. Although Canada earlier
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on e:iperienced the U.S. threat and had to devote itself to escapin5 
from U.S. control when it became unacceptable* it appears easier for 
Canada to depend on the U.S. for its defence than for Japan.
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Attitude of the Public towards the U.S.
In spite of the fact that a large proportion of the Canadian 
population is of French origin, integration with American culture seems 
to be greater in Canada than in any other part of the world. Except 
those who are solely French-speaking, Canadians are greatly influenced 
through the media of American television, radio, newspapers and maga­
zines. Host Canadians, living within 100 to 150 miles of the U.S. 
border, are easily within reach of the American mass media.
Canadian integration into American culture, thus, derives not 
or&y from Canada*s cultural and linguist!cal similarity with the U.S., 
but also from its geographical proximity. In all these respects, Japan 
is much less likely to be integrated with the American culture.
Japan is an island country located at the other side of the 
Pacific Ocean, and the Japanese people are entirely different from the 
Americans ethnically, culturally and linguistically. Although great 
developments in the mass media and in transportation have made it 
inevitable that Japan participate in cultural exchange with the rest 
of the world,the distinctive identity of the Japanese culture is still 
well-preserved. It provides a good contrast with the Canadian culture, 
which is confronted "with the danger of losing its identity.
The great divergence in cultural ties with the U.S. between 
Canada and Japan makes their attitude towards the U.S. very different 
from each other, both in terms of general relations and military co­
operation. The differences, as seen in various public opinion poll 
results, seem to bear very close relation to the differences in defence 
policies taken by Canada and Japan in the postwar period to the present.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
21
Prior to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
a large number of Canadians (A2%) mere already aware of being more depen-
22
dent on the U.S. than ever before. A few years later, a majority of 
Canadians (60%) thought Canada should continue to encourage U.S. invest­
ment to help develop natural resources, not fearing that their way of
23
life night be dangerously influenced by the U.S.
Before Japan became independent in 1951, the majority of
Japanese honed that Japan would be pro-American rather than pro-Soviet 
24
or neutralist. For the Japanese, being pro-Am.erican did not mean,
however, that they approved the presence of U.S. bases in their country-
25
from the very beginning of Japanese-American military co-operation.
In the mid and late Fifties, the differences in attitude towards
the U.S. between Canada and Japan became increasingly distinguishable.
Canadian opinion of economic relations with the U.S. in 1956 showed that
the public felt development which was financed by U.S. money was benefi- 
26
cial for Canada. More Canadians in 1956 (63%) than in 1951 (AC/i) believed
that their way of life was not being overly influenced by the U.S.,
although at the end of the decade, the majority (50%) knew Canada had
27
become more dependent on the U.S. for air defence.
In Japan, in this period from the mid to late Fifties, an
increasing number of Japanese opposed the presence of American bases in
28
Japan, mainly because it was offensive to national pride. The Japanese,
however, seem to have been in a dilemma, at that time, wondering what
they should do about their own defence. They opposed the American bases
in Japan, on the one hand, and, on the other, they hesitated to ream
29
themselves, although they realized the necessity of military forces.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
22
When the najority of the Japanese agreed that the best way to protect
Japan’s securitv was either by their own forces or collective security
30
(which required Japan to have its own forces)} they were undecided over
the meaning of "own forces."
In the early Siizties, Canadians felt the danger of a threat from
the Soviet Union, believing that the Russian claims for peace were merely
propaganda and that the Soviet Union was really further advanced militarily 
31
than the U.S. Although more Canadians regarded China as the greatest
threat to world peace, the najority, in 1962, favoured an increase in
Uestera military strength in order to counteract the power of the Soviet 
32
Union. This indicated that Canadian military forces in Europe, at least,
should not be reduced.
Moreover, during this period, a great majority of Canadians agreed
that Canada was becoming more and more dependent on the U.S. for their
air defence, and that their defence in general had become mors integrated
33
with that of the U.S. In spite of this, the possibility of conn lete
34
dependence on the U.S. for Canada’s defence was strongly rejected.
The Sixties were, for the Japanese, the beginning of the so-
called "new era" of Japanese-American relations, following the stormy
period of 1958-1960. Just before the renewal of the bilateral Security
Treaty with the U.S. in 1960, a majority of Japanese favoured general
co-operation with the U.S. in the future, while a large number of them
worried that the Treaty would increase the possibility of Japanese
35
involvement in war.
In snite of the unprecedented prosperity in Japan, the majority
36
of Japanese were uneasy about their future and the possibility of war.
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Strongly opposing to join the Communist bloc, they sought to eliminate 
38
war. Although they were uneasy, more than 80 per cent of the people
39
favoured having Self-Defence Forces in the mid Sixties.
In 1S67, when Canada’s foreign policy under the Pearson Govern­
ment emphasised the peacekeeping role, the najority of the pecole sup-
40
ported the government’s policy and considered it satisfactory. Uhile
41
they wished Canada to pursue a more independent role, in 1967, a great
majoritv in Canada favoured continuation of membership in both military
42
alliances— NATO and NCHAD.
By 1970, a najority of Canadians, particularly in Ontario,
expressed the opinion that Canada is more dependent on the U.S. than 
43
in previous years. However, they are satisfied vith being Canadians,
and thev believe that Canada is the country which will have the nost
44
to offer ordinary people for their happiness.
In the late Sixties, nost Jananese feared being three tened by
. ‘ 45
China because of its continual nuclear bonb testings. In spite of this
threat (or perhaps because of the threat) almost 70 per cent of the
majority favoured friendlier relations or normalization of dinlonatic
46
relations with Communist China.
Although the najority of Japanese agreed that Japan’s economic
47
prosperity had depended on American protection for its security, they
48
considered the U.S. troops no longer necessary for Japan’s security.
This tendency seems to be closely related to their doubt of American
49
sincerity to protect Japan in case of emergency, and to the growing
50
feeling of need for self-defence.
Thus, as the results of public opin5.or. polls show, Canadians, in
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general*'are much more favourable to Anericans than are the Japanese.
In military relations, while Canadians prefer "co-operation" with the 
U.S. to complete dependence on then, the Japanese people refuse even 
"co-operation," if it means allowing the Americans to retain their bases 
in Japan.
The favourable attitude of Canadians towards Anericans seer.is to 
bear very close relation to Canada's similarity with the U.S. in geo­
graphical and socio-cultural aspects. In turn, the Japanese people talce 
a nuch less favourable attitude towards the U.S., particularly with 
regard to its military alliance with the U.S., largely owing to its 
socio-cultural divergence with that country. These differences in 
general attitude towards the U.S. between Canada and Japan appear to 
be closely related to the trends of their military co-operation with 
the U.S. in the postwar period to the present.
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Salient International Environments
The foreign and defence policies of a country are, needless to 
say, closely related to international environments. That Canada could 
play such a respected role as a mediator in the Suez crisis of 1956 was 
not only because of the diplomatic skill of the Secretary of State for 
External Affairs, Lester Pearson, and Canada’s advantage of British and 
French heritage, but also because international environments were in 
favour of Canada at the time. Japan, too, was economically, to a large 
extent, saved by special procurements in the Korean War. Without the 
Korean War, Japan might never have been able to enjoy the gigantic 
economic power it basks in today.
No sooner was the United Nations, the successor to the League 
of Nations, established in 1945, than the Cold War between the Communist 
powers and the Western powers was in progress. Because of the ideolo­
gical antagonism in the Cold War, the United Nations was divided by the 
rivalry between the two blocs: the Communist bloc led by the Soviet 
Union and the Western bloc led by the U.S.
The tension between the two power blocs reached its peak in
the late Forties with the Berlin blockade (1949), and the proclamation
of the Communist Chinese Government (1949). At the time of the Berlin
blockade, Canada swiftly moved toward the formation of the North Atlantic
community. Owing to the ineffective role of the U.N. in the Cold War
disputes and to an unacceptable degree of American control over Canada’s
political independence, Canadian political leaders seized the opportunity
to bring North America into the North Atlantic alliance with the western
51
European countries..
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The Korean War (1950-53) gave two different kinds of opportunity
to Canada and Japan: for Canada— a political one—  to provide foundations
52
for Canada’s reputation for objectivity and independence, and for Japan-
53
to give the Japanese economy a decisive injection of prosperity.
After the Korean War, Canada became deeply involved politically 
in Asian affairs in Indo-China, Kashmir, Palestine and Lebanon. Its 
reputation as an impartial mediator was at a premium in the Suez crisis 
of I960.
While Canada was busy establishing a reputation for independent
diplomacy, Japan was concentrating entirely on economic growth in
54
almost the same manner as half a century before. Japan, at the time 
of the Korean War—  the climax of the Cold War, and just when it became 
relieved of the long period of American control, hardly found it pos­
sible to envisage independence without alignment with the U.S.
The Fifties was an era of alliance for Japan in contrast to 
Canada’s relatively independent diplomacy. At San Francisco in 1951j 
Japan concluded the Peace Treaty and the bilateral Security Treaty with 
the U.S., and in 1952, other bilateral Peace Treaties with Taiwan and 
India. In 1956, when Canada was one of the most significant participants 
in the U.N., Japan was just beginning its membership in the international 
organization. In spite of its restored relations with many parts of the 
world, Japan played a passive role in international activities throughout 
the Fifties.
For Canada, the Sixties proved much less favourable than the Fifties 
for playing a significant role on the international scene. The 
possession of advanced nuclear weapons by both superpowers and other
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great powers, the rise in international politics of de Gaulle as leader 
of an independent foreign policy, the formation of regionalism among 
Afro-Asian states, and the preoccupation with biculturalisn and bilin­
gualism at home--all these changes decreased the role Canada could play.
As a result, the loud voice from the French Canadians drew more attention
from Canadians in the mid Sixties than the government’s effort to inte­
grate U.!T. peacekeeping forces into the overall structure of its own 
55
defence policies. Canada, thus, cane to focus its attention on domestic 
affairs, rather than external ones, leaving its defence under the super­
vision of the U.S.
On the other hand, for Japan, the Sixties woe a time of prosperity,
when it slowly rose to its feet and started to play a more positive role,
at least in Asia. The estrangement between the Chinese Communists and
the Soviets developed from the difference of opinion over whether world
56
war could be banished while capitalism still exists. 'Jhon the Vietnam 
Far was rapidly escalated after the accession of the Johnson Administra­
tion, China simultaneously showed its nuclear capability by conducting 
a series of continuous nuclear testings.
Japan’s uneasiness in this kind of Asian environment" was further 
aggravated by its heavy dependence on the American military protection, 
which allowed the U.S. virtually a free hand militarily on Japanese soil.
In this respect, international environments clearly had some effect on 
Japan’s defence policy which has gradually moved from U.S. control to a 
form of rather independent self-defence.
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National Interests and Policy Objectives
Since the time of Confederation in 1867, the social and economic 
bases of Canadian national interests have, of course, undergone change 
but have never been completely transformed. Even after Canada's active 
participation in the Second World War, the components of Canadian national 
interest have changed little, although rather different policies have 
been adopted.
In contrast to this strong element of continuity in Canada's 
social and economic bases, Japanese traditional life underwent a profound 
transformation. After the end of the War and during the Occupation, Japan 
endeavoured to obliterate the past period of nationalistic militarism 
from its memory. As a result, the social and economic foundations were 
revamped in the postwar period of Japan.
Although there were great differences in the immediate constitu­
ents of national interests, both Canada and Japan after World War II 
have been strongly concerned with promoting economic relations with 
as many countries as possible in the world. If it is agreed that a 
nation's policy should be aimed at promoting its prosperity and security, 
to maintain good relations with the U.S. has been one of most desired 
ends shared by Canada and Japan.
A nation's policies are, however, conditioned by external and 
internal environments. Immediately after World War II, multiplicity 
of relationships became an important objective in Canada's foreign 
policy— to secure its independence from the unacceptable degree of control 
by the U.S. While political independence was one of the most prominent 
national interests of Canada, Japan’s national policy concentrated on
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
economic recovery. Kith little responsibility in and negligible influ­
ence on world affairs, Japan*s realistic policy of economic development 
and prosperity has net with spectacular success.
Canada, on the one hand, intended to preserve national security 
by means of e::panding its relationships through the U.K.* 1I.AI0 and the 
Commonwealth without reducing economic ties with the U.S. On the other 
hand, Japan attempted to regain its economic prosperity, almost entirely 
depending on the U.S. for its economic and military co-operation.
In the Sixties, Canada’s prosperity and security became more 
interrelated with that of the U.S. Canadian national policy became more 
based upon the interdependence than the independence of nations. Econo­
mically and militarily dependent on the U.S., to a large extent, the 
Canadian leaders in the late Sixties came to conclude that:
For Canadians to offer ill-informed criticism of United States 
foreign policy, without recognising the enormous responsibili­
ties which go with Anerican power, and without recognising the 
degree to which our (Canadian) interests coincide with those of 
the United States, would be a sign of immaturity and could have 
unfortunate consequences.^7
In order to survive as an independent nation, however, Canada
has undertaken a policy of multiplicity of relationships which prevents
a further erosion of Canadian autonomy. Based on a middlepowermanship
and a bicultural heritage, it seems to be this direction towards which
58
Canada has begun moving within its national capability.
The first step in Japan’s national policy, after rapidly 
recovering economically, was to settle basic territorial disputes.
In the Sixties, it became a main aim of Japanese independent foreign 
policy to have former territories returned from both superpowers--the 
Okinawa Islands and the Cgasawara Islands from the U.S., and the
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Habomai and Shikotan Islands of the ICuriles froa tlie Soviet Union.
In its attempt to establish national prestige, Japan has gradually 
become aware of the danger of being too dependent on the U.S. militarily 
and economically. Unlike Canada’s tendency towards interdependence with 
the U.S., Japan appears to have already begun, in the late Sixties, 
seeking to protect its economic prosperity and security more indepen­
dently.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
PACT TT'O
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
Structures of the Department of Ihrternal 
Affairs and the llinistry of 
Foreign Affairs
Senior Officials in the Department 
and llinistry
The Trine ilinister
The Cabinet
The People and Opposition Parties
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 2
Structures of the Derartment of External Affairs and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
Both Canada and Japan follow the parliamentary system, which is 
very similar to that of Britain. Although Canada operates under 
federalism and Japan under a unitary system, the political institu­
tions of the two countries have rather similar functions.
In both countries, foreign and defence policy-making is 
effected through the co-operation of the Prime Minister, other Ministers 
whose departments are most related to foreign and defence policy issues, 
and senior officials in these departments. Of these departments, the 
Department of External Affairs (or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) is, 
without a doubt, most involved with foreign policy-making.
To understand their functions, it is necessary to examine their 
structures and certain characteristics of senior officials in the 
Department, and the whole foreign policy-making process. In this 
examination, differences may be found not only in the departmental 
structure and senior officials, but also in the Prime Ministership, 
other Ministers and the opposition parties of the two countries.
Canada's Department of External Affairs, in the early Fifties, 
was small in terms of number of employees and expenditures. But, after 
gradual expansion in the late Fifties and early Sixties, the Department 
of today has approximately 3»200 employees and receives more than 2 per 
cent of the total budget of the Government. Japan's Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was, in the early Fifties, of notable size; its expenditures 
accounted for more than one per cent of the government's total budget. 
However, unlike the Canadian Department, the Ministry has not expanded in
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proportion to other ministries. Today* the Ministry is much smaller 
than the Canadian Department in terms of total expenditures, number of 
employees and the percentage of departmental expenditures in the govern­
ment Ts total budget. (Table 4)
An examination of the Canadian Department chows that there mere 
altogether ten divisions in 1946* based on geography and subjects.
Among then were three political divisions. The first dealt with "questions 
of international organisations and general natters affecting the peace 
settlement"; the second looked after political affairs in Europe and the 
Commonwealth; the third dealt with the political aspect of American conti­
nents and the Far East. The other divisions were the Legal* Treaty,
1
Diplomatic, Economic, Information, and Administrative Divisions.
The first political division became the United nations Division,
and the second and the third political divisions were divided into three
geographical divisions: the European, the Commonwealth, and the American
and Far Eastern Divisions. Moreover, the Diplomatic Division was divided
into the Frotocol and the Consular Divisions. A new Personnel and a new
Defence Liaison Division were added. These changes all occurred in 1949.
At the end of the 1940*s, the Department was headed by an Under-Secretary
with a Deputy Secretary and three Assistant Under-Secretaries who super-
2
vised altogether twelve divisions in the Department.
In the 1950*s, the Department grew from 259 officers to 402, but
3
the total number of employees did not increase proportionately. Its 
budget grew from $9,100,000 in 1950, to $40,900,000 in 1955 and to 
$70,600,000 in 1959. During these years, eight more divisions were 
added to the Department, bringing the total number of divisions to
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twenty. Both the Defence Liaison and the Economic Divisions cane to 
constitute two independent divisions; the American and Far Eastern 
Division becane tuo different divisions; and the Finance* Historical, 
Personnel* Supplies and Properties, and Hiddle Eastern Divisions were 
newly added, lloreover, the Inspection Service, Political Co-ordination 
Section and Press Office 'were appended as "other units."
By 1968* the Department further expanded'its personnel and 
organization. The number of foreign officers and the total number of 
employees increased from 414 to 815 (1960-58), and from 1,998 to 3,192 
(1960-68) respectively. A gradual move in the direction of speciali­
zation had tahen place in its organization. The departmental organi­
zation had become more and more complex with each succeeding year.
Included amongst the changes was the establishment of a separate division 
for U.S. affairs.
In 1969, the staff of the Department was headed by an Under­
secretary with a Deputy Under-Secretary and four Assistant Under­
secretaries. The work of the Department in Ottawa was carried on
4
through 18 divisions, 3 offices, 3 branches and 4 other special offices. 
However, the principle of organization by geography and subject remained 
intact.
Uhile the organizational principle of Canada’s Department of 
External Affairs remained unchanged after Uorld Uar II, the Japanese 
Ministry was totally reorganised in principle, in the Occupation period.
In 1948, the Ministry consisted of a Secretai'iat, five Bureaus (General 
Affairs, Treaties, Research and Documentation, Control and Civil Property), 
two Divisions (Public Relations and Special Records) and a Foreign Service
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Training Institute. The llinistry, at this tine, was organised, unlike
5
Canada*s Department o£ External Affairs, solely on the basis of subjects.
In 1951, when Japan becane independent with the conclusion of 
the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, the llinistry was reorganised, this 
tine, on the basis of geography and subjects, similar to the present 
Canadian Department of External Affairs. However, even in the Sixties, 
the llinistry w7as one of the smallest among the twelve ministries of the 
Japanese Government both in terms of employees and expenditures.
In 1968, there were nine bureaus in the llinistry, divided on the
6
basis of regions and subjects. Four of these bureaus were political- 
geographical ones: the Asian Affairs, American Affairs, European
Affairs, and Middle Eastern and African Affairs Bureaus. Uithin each 
bureau, the designated area of its work was further subdivided into two 
to four sections according to smaller regions. In addition to the 
political-geographical bureaus, there were five bureaus which dealt 
with specific subjects of foreign policy. They were the United Nations, 
Treaties, Economic Co-operation, Economic .Affairs, and Public Information 
and Cultural Affairs Bureaus.
Uhile the Canadian Department of External Affairs places more 
emphasis on divisions related to international, organizations, Japan*s 
Foreign Ministry, under the direction of the Deputy Under-Secretary, 
appears to lay more stress upon the Economic Affairs Bureau and the 
Minister*s Secretariat.
The staff of the llinistry is headed by a Minister with a 
Parliamentary Vice-Minister and a Permanent Vice-Minister. As his 
advisors, moreover, approximately 15 counsellors are listed at the top
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level, nost of whom are ex-ambassadors. The work of the llinistry is 
carried on under the direction of these top officers, through altogether 
9 bureaus, 3 branches, and one Minister*s Secretariat.
TABLE 4.
Conparison of Department of External Affairs and llinistry of 
Foreign Affairs by Employees and Expenditures
Expenditures in thousands 
dollars
of U.S.
Department of External An g a i r s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Year Employees Exc-enditures A Employees Expenditures B
1955 1,610 43,800 1 • 0" 1,763 35,900 1.3%
1956 1,701 44,900 1.0 1,796 18,700 0.7
1957 1,795 60,200 1.2 1,837 22,700 0.7
1958 1,831 60,200 1.2 1,941 25,900 0.7
1959 1,859 75,500 1.4 2,059 29,900 0.7
1960 1,998 97,200 1.7 2,185 34,900 0.7
1961 2,095 103,000 1.7 2,401 41,600 0.7
1962 2,084 95,600 1.5 2,451 50,100 0.7
1963 2,159 S5,200 1.3 2,517 53,100 0.6
196<-: 2,298 97,000 1.4 2,546 58,600 0.6
1965 2, 644 131,200 1.8 2,611 64,600 0.6
1966 2,817 152,500 2.0 2,697 85,300 0.7
1967 3, 069 230,500 2.6 2,749 88,800 0.6
1968 3, 192 215,700 2.2 2,746 98,300 0.6
Fote: A = percentages of expenditures of theDepartment in the total 
go ve rnne nt a 1 e: a: end i t ur* e s.
B = Percentages of expenditures of the Ministry in the total 
go ve rnne n t a 1 e xp- en d i t u r e s.
Expenditure figures are calculated on a U.S. dollar base equivalent 
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360, regardless of fluctuation.
Source: Canada, Department of External Affairs, Annual Bcrort, 1955 - I960, 
The Queen*s hrinter, Ottawa, and Department of Finance, Budget 
Speech, 1955 - 1968, The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa.
Japan, Prime Minister*c Office, ITihon Tokei Nenkan, 1962 - 1968.
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As previously mentioned, the Canadian Department of External 
Affairs has been expanding much faster than the Foreign Affairs Ministry 
of Japan, in terms of employees and expenditures. Moreover, the Canadian 
Department has three divisions dealing with political-military affairs: 
the Worth American Defence and MATO Division, the Peacekeeping and 
Military Assistance Division, and the Defence Liaison (2) Division. In 
the Japanese Ministry, there is only one section on military affairs, 
which is found in the Anerican Bureau. This Bureau also deals with 
political affairs of the American continents.
In contrast to this small section devoted to military affairs, 
the Ministry has two large bureaus: Economic Affairs and Economic Co­
operation. One is divided into 10 sections on the basis of regions, and 
the other into 6 sections on the basis of subjects. In Canada, the 
Office of Economic Affairs, which is further divided into three divisions, 
comes under the direction of the same Assistant Under-Secretary as the 
one responsible for Latin American and U.S.A. Affairs.
In the Department of External Affairs, there is a separate 
division for handling relations with the U.S., as well as the North 
American Defence and MATO Division, and in nearly all the other Divisions, 
the work of the officer is influenced by an awareness of Canada's "special" 
relationship with the U.S. However, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has only the Korth American Section, which deals with both U.S. 
and Canadian affairs, under the direction of the Chief of the American 
Affairs Bureau. In structure, at least, the U.S. is much less importantly 
ranked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than in the Department of 
External Affairs.
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Although both the Department of External Affairs and llinistry of 
Foreign Affairs are organised on the basis of regions and subjects, their 
differences indicate that the Canadian Department has somewhat of a 
political and military character, whereas the Japanese llinistry has the 
characteristics of a cultural and economic organisation. These functional 
characteristics may further be related to the possibility that the 
Canadian Department of External Affairs has mors influence over defence 
policy-making, than has the Japanese Foreign Affairs llinistry.
The national Defence Agency of Japan is not classified, at 
least legally, as highly as the Department of national Defence in 
Canada. The national Defence Agency does not enjoy full authority as a 
llinistry, although the Director General of the Agency is a Cabinet nenber. 
Unlike Japan*s case, the Canadian Department of national Defence not only 
has full ministerial status, but also is one of the largest Departments 
in the government.
Practically speaking, however, the National Defence Agency is 
not necessarily less influential in defence policy-making than the 
Department of National Defence. Because of the emphasis on cultural 
and economic affairs within Japan’s Foreign Affairs llinistry, defence 
policy-making appears to be the work of the Defence Agency. In Canada, 
on the other hand, defence policy-making is not always a prerogative of 
the Department of National Defence, because the Department of External 
Affairs is much more concerned with national defence policy.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 9
Senior Officials in the Department and the Ministry
In addition to the roles the Department and the Ministry play, 
the characteristics of senior officers in foreign affairs are also 
important. In both Canada and Japan, the bureaucracy is one of the 
most significant factors in the foreign policy-making process.
Senior officials are those who are experts in the field, and therefore, 
are very important as well as influential in policy-making. Their 
influence on policy-making becomes much greater when the Minister and 
the Prime Minister at the very top level lack special knowledge of 
their field. Furthermore, when these officials are strictly career men, 
their view may be very profound but, at the same time, narrow and 
inflexible.
Lester Pearson, as Under-Secretary for External Affairs, 
explained in January, 1947 how the top posts of the Canadian Department 
should be filled:
In the U.S. diplomatic service the very top posts have rarely, 
if ever, been held by career men. That I think is not good for 
the morale of the Foreign Service. On the other hand, the 
British diplomatic service is sometimes criticized as too much 
of a closed corporation of officials recruited from a limited 
class of persons. I think the Canadian service has given evidence 
that it will avoid these extremes . . . .  .7
8
Among the top 64 officers of the Department, 27 started their 
careers in the Department. Ten worked for other Federal Government 
Departments or Agencies before joining the Department. The rest came 
from various fields of society. There were news reporters and journal
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•editors(6), lawyers(6), university teaching staff(6), high school
teachers(2), insurance company workers(2), a poet, among others.
However, once they joined the Department, a very limited number of them 
9
(4 our of 64) have been transferred to another Department or have 
voluntarily worked outside the Department.
The variety of previous experience among the Canadian officers is 
one of the most significant differences compared with the Japanese counter­
parts. Another significant difference is in education. While a 
Bachelor's degree from Tokyo University is an established avenue to 
higher positions in the foreign service in Japan, it appears that Canada's
foreign service officers are required to have at least two degrees.
10
Among the 63 top officers, 6l have at least one university degree;
59 from Canadian universities and two from a British university. Forty-
11
four of the 6l have more than one degree. The remaining two of the 63 
have devoted themselves to international studies abroad. This offers no 
comparison with the Japanese case in which there are only seven out of 57 
higher foreign service officers who have a Master's degree.
Another distinctive difference between Canadian and Japanese 
higher officers in this field is the presence of an academic clique.
Unlike Japan, where more than 80 per cent of these officers are graduates 
of Tokyo University, there is hardly any indication of an academic clique 
amongst Canadian officers. There are 16 University of Toronto graduates, 
but this is only about one-quarter of those with degrees. The remaining 
45 are from the University of British Columbia(6), the University of 
Manitoba(5), Dalhousie and Queens University(4 each), the University of 
Alberta and Bishops University(3 each), and fifteen other universities
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and colleges.
By region# 24 of the 61 obtained their first degree in Ontario;
13 in Quebec; 6 in British Columbia; 5 each in Manitoba and ITova Scotia;
and 2 in Britain. This corresponds roughly with birthplace e::cept for
12
those foreign-born. This regional distribution changes slightly in 
higher education beyond a Bachelor’s degree. Half of the eleven Bachelor 
of Law degrees were obtained in Ontario# while more than half of the ten 
Doctor of Law degrees were given in Quebec. At the blaster’s degree level# 
eleven degrees were obtained fron universities in the U.S.(6)# Britain(4)> 
and France(1).
As for the Japanese senior officials in the Ministry of Foreign
13
Affairs# fifty-eight top officials (excluding the Minister and Farliamen- 
tary Vice-Minister, both of whom are political appointees fron members of 
the Diet) are examined in this paper. In 1968# forty-seven of then in 
the Ministry had passed the Foreign Service Examination, a year prior to 
or in the sane year as graduation fron the university (this examination 
is one kind of higher Civil Service Examination). Access to higher 
positions in the Ministry is very much restricted to those \ t\ i o  have 
passed the Examination.
Among those who have passed the Foreign Service Examination# an 
important advantage in the Ministry is graduation from Tokyo University. 
Eighty-three per cent of these top fifty-eight officers are graduates 
of that University, and more than 60 per cent of them have degrees in 
law.
Compared with the Canadian top civil servants in External 
Affairs, the incidence of education beyond a first degree is significantly
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
lover in Japanese civil .servants* Only seven out of the fifty-eight 
have a Llaster’s degree, and none has a Doctor’s degree, lloreover, 
only tvo have studied abroad— both at Cambridge University, cne obtaining 
a degree there.
TABLE 5.
Average Ages for Selected Senior Officials in the 
Department of External Affairs by Positions (196S)
Uhole Department . . .  ........ . . . . . . . .  51.0
O t t a v a ................................... 47.2
A b r o a d.........     55.3
Upon Joining Department . . . . . . . . . . . .  29.7
First Secretary ............ . . . . . . . . .  32.5
Counsellor  .........   40.2
llinister  ................................. 43.5
Consul (or Consul General) ...................  43.8
Assistant Under-Cecrctary .............   44.0
Deputy Under-Secretary . . . . . . . . . . . . .  46.4
High Commissioner .......... . . . . . . . . .  46.5
Head of Division.............   46.7
Permanent Representative to
International Organization ........ . . .  47.1
Hissron heae . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  47 *3
Ambassador  .................   47.9
Under-Secretary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49.0
Ambassador to International Organisation . . . .  54.2
Fron the above table, it appears that the importance of 
position and promotion in the Department of External Affairs depends 
upon seniority, to a large extent. This table also shovs that Canada 
sends older and more e::perienced officers to foreign nations and to 
international organisations. But senior officers at home are rather 
young, except for the highest position, the Under-Secretary'.
As far as promotion is concerned, the figures shorn that it 
t:ahes some tine to become a Counsellor after having been mronoted to
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First Secretary. Forever, once one has become a Counsellor} the T.;ay 
to the ambassadorial level appears rather clear. Those mho rere 
recruited to the Department at the age of forty or older, nost often 
go abroad as an advisor or an ambassador. At hone, almost all of the 
higher positions are filled by career men, and it appears that there is 
a close relationship between higher positions and longer careers in the 
Department. Thus, the recruitment in the Department of External Affairs 
appears rather closed, at least as far as the top posts at Ottawa are 
concerned.
Unlike Canadian officers, the higher civil servants in the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs have hardly ever experienced wcrldng for 
other iiinistrics or outside the government before the;; started serving 
the Ilinistry. Even after their service started in the Ilinistry, fifteen 
out of 57 (data for one of these 5C is not available) have been trans­
ferred to other agencies or Iiinistrics of the national government for a 
14
limited tine. Because of this career stability in the Ilinistry, it nay 
be assumed that important positions are ranked in tens of seniority.
If this is so, taking an example of the average ages of those who held 
high posts within the Ilinistry and of selected ambassadors as 53.5 and 
57.0 (in 1S68) respectively, the latter appear higher in classification 
than the former (except for the Vice-Hinister and the Foreign Affairs 
Councillors). Furthermore, the average age of those appointed to a 
position as an oi'dinary ambassador is 50.7, but for more important 
ambassadors (U.K., U.S.S.S., U.S.A., France, Korea, Germany, India, 
Australia and International Organisations), it is 55.2. These figures 
seem to indicate a possible classification for positions from Head of a
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Section to Vice-ilinister.
TABLE 6.
Ages for Selected Senior Officials in the 
Ilinistry of Foreign -.'iffairs by Positions (1968)
.Upon Joining Ilinistry . . . . . . . . . . . . .  24.1
Section Head...................    37.9
First Secretary...........   39.1
Counsel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  40.2
Counsellor (Abroad) . . . . . . .  ............ 44.4
Counsel General  .........     46.8
Vice-Chief of Bureau...........   47.6
Uxnister . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  48 • -1
Chief of Frotocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  49.3
Chief of ilinister*s Secretariat . . . . . . . .  49.3
Chief of B u r e a u ............................... 49.4
Anbassador (General)   50.7
Head of Department............................. 51.8
Head of Institute.........   54.0
Foreign Affairs Councillors .................  56.0
Ambassador (Selected) .......... . . . . . . .  55.2
Vice-ilinister . . .      58.0
Examination of the above information reveals some important 
differences between the Canadian senior officers and those of Japan. 
First of ail, in spite of the fact that the top posts of Canada*s 
External Affairs Department ai*e rather closed to outsiders, the back­
ground experience of senior officials in Canada shows much mere variety 
than that of Japanese officials prior to joining the Department.
Secondly, there is no established educational institution 
required of a senior official in Canada, whereas in Japan there is a 
strong tendency for graduates of Tokyo University to have the advantage. 
Compared with the Canadian case in which those with higher degrees than 
a Bachelor’s can go into this field, in Japan, those who have most
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opportunity to be highly promoted arc those nko get into the ilinistry 
as soon as they obtain their Bachelor*s degree.
Thirdly, in contrast to the younger age at which men join the 
Ilinistry in Japan, the average ages for higher posts are nuch higher anonr 
Japanese officials than Canadian ones. This indicates that, in Japan, 
higher posts require longer careers in the Ilinistry, since very few have 
been recruited from, or to other Iiinistrics.
These differences become very important in the consideration of 
the scope of foreign policy. Judging only fron the background character­
istics of senior officials, Canadian officials appear to have nuch more 
variety and a broader experience for foreign policy-making than do the 
Japanese. As senior officials are often very influential over decision- 
making, their broader ideas and information nay help create a more 
flexible diplomacy, instead of one effected by narrow, inflexible ideas, 
tyoical of Japanese senior officials.
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The Prime Ilinister
Fron the tine the Borden Government brought the Department
15
legally and practically V7ithin the Brine 'Iinister,s authority in 1912
until 1947, it was the Prine Ilinister of Canada xdio held the portfolio
of Secretary of State for External Affairs. Even after that date, Louis
St. Laurent, the first Secrotarv of State who was not a Prime Ilinister,
16
was, to a large e::tcnt, under the control of the Prine Ilinister.
"The Prime Ilinister," writes Janes Eayrs, "bears inevitably a
unique responsibility for his country*s e::ternal policy even if by taste
and temperament he has little interest in it; and circumstances make it
17
likely that he will have too nuch interest rather than too little."
Because the Prine Ilinister is the leader of the cabinet and foreign
policy is his prerogative, it is difficult for him to avoid direct
involvement in international relations.
In the postwar period t; e ties between the Prine ilinister and
foreign affairs have been special and close, with the exception of the
Diefenbaker Cabinet. Until Pierre Trudeau-replaced Lester Pearson as
Prime Ilinister, this was so. Prine Ilinister Diefenbaker, who held the
portfolio of Secretary of State for External Affairs himself for two
periods of twelve weeks, felt that most of the officials in the Department
1G
were "partisan in the direction of the Liberal Party," because they had
19
been appointed by that party. Pierre Trudeau had neither the associations 
nor the crrperience with the leadership of the Department that his Liberal 
predecessors had.
In addition to the fact that special tics between the Prine 
Ilinister and foreign affairs have existed, the powers of the Canadian
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Prime Ilinister are great. It. IfacGregor Dawson eplains the great
powers of the Prime Ilinister as follows:
They spring fron his position of primacy in the Government re­
inforced by his leadership of the majority party, which usually 
owes its majority, indeed, to his leadership during the last 
election. The Prime Ilinister as such may possess virtually no 
legal authority; but operating through the Governor General, the 
Privy Council, a minister, or sometimes as a minister in his osm 
right, his powers are very great indeed.
Hot only the cabinet ministers who are appointed by the Prime Ilinister,
but also most of his Partyfs members are dependent on him for leadership.
They recognise his pre-eminent position and accept his leadership, because
’’their political survival in the cabinet and in the house of Commons 
21
depends on him.”
In Japan, some Prime ministers have held the portfolio of
Ilinister of Foreign Affairs in the postwar period. The first Prime
Ilinister under the new Constitution of 1946, Yoshida Shigeru, held that
portfolio for three years out of his more than seven-year term as Prime
Ilinister. The others are Ashida Kitoshi (7 months), Kishi Hobusuhe (5
22
months), and Sato Eisahu (1 month).
However, the fact that some Japanese Prime Ilinisters have held
the portfolio of the Ilinister of Foreign Affairs does not necessarily
mean that they were experts in foreign affairs. Except for Yoshida and
Ashida, the rest had experience related neither to this field in general,
23
nor to the Ilinistry of Foreign Affairs.
Constitutionally, the Frine Ilinister of Japan has great power; he 
appoints all ministers and can dismiss any of them at will; he supervises 
his government and is responsible to the Diet for reporting external and 
internal affairs. His power extends to the control of police power in
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emergency situations and to the ultimate decision to order the military
force to be sent out. His authority is superior to the Chairman of the
24
National Defence Council.
In practice} the pover of the Prime Ilinister of Japan is drastically 
weakened by the presence of a unique form of factionalism which creates 
intraparty factional struggles. The Prime Minister’s efforts} therefore} 
are spent on keeping his position safe, and he devotes himself more to 
factions for support} than to influencing other parts of the policy­
making process in the direction he desires. All Prime Ministers* particu­
larly after the merger of the Liberal and the Democratic Parties into the
Liberal Democratic Party in 1955* have lacked control over the Party} as 
25
a mhole.
This lad; of leadership of Japan’s Prime Ilinister may also be
explained by the fact that since 1947* eight Prine Ministers have
26
presided over eighteen Cabinets. Almost every year in the 23-year period* 
the Prime Minister of Japan has dissolved and formed a Cabinet. Further­
more* the average term of a Prime Minister.from 1947 through to the end 
of 1969 is only 33 months* although some Prime Ministers such as Yoshida* 
Uceda and Sato have been in pover longer. It is only half the average 
term of the Canadian Prime Ministers in the same period (1946-1968). The 
longer average term seeras to indicate a nuch stronger hold on leadership.
Thus, there is a consider-able difference betv?een Prime Ministers 
of Japan ana Canada in terms of their control over the Party. The 
Canadian Prime Minister possesses virtually no legal authority, but in 
practice his pover is so enormous; on the other hand, the Prime Minister 
of Japan has considerable legal pover, but in practice it is decidedly
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■weakened by Japan*s unique factionalism.
There have been six Frine Ministers in Canada since the end of 
the Mar. Only one, Lester Pearson, was an ex-bureaucrat, Anong the 
eight postwar Frine Ministers in Japan, only two (Tetsu Iiatayana and 
Tanzan Ishibashi), were non-bureaucrats and neither of then held their 
Frine Ministership for more than eight months.
In spite of their characteristic of bureaucratic background, 
the Japanese Prime Ministers generally lack leadership and experience 
in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This, intermingled with their 
short-lived term and their lack of leadership in the Cabinet, allows more 
power to senior officials of the Foreign Ministry in the foreign policy­
making process. The Canadian Prime Minister, on the other hand, has 
better control over senior officials in the Department of External 
Affairs, mainly owing to his strong leadership in the Cabinet and the 
long-established fact that foreign policy is his prerogative.
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The Cabinet
The Cabinet is the ultimate decision-male inn body both in internal 
and external policies. Under the leadership of the Frine Minister-, most 
of foreign and defence policies are made among the Frine Minister and 
other Cabinet members whose departments are directly involved in phases 
of international relations. Besides the Foreign Minister (or the 
Secretary' of State for External Affairs), the Minister of Finance, the 
Minister of Trade and Industry and the Minister of National Defence (or 
Director General of the National Defence Agency) are often directly 
involved in foreign and defence policy decision-making.
This section attempts to make a comparison of the Ministers of 
these two countries in terms of longevity, education and effectiveness of 
appointment to their portfolios. If a Minister is too short-lived, he nay 
not be able to exploit his own skill and knowledge in order to form a 
dominant policy. If he is appointed to the portfolio in disregard of 
his special background, he may not be able to co-operate with his 
Departmental officials and, as a result, may cause the people to be dis­
satisfied with the government policy itself.
In the period 1S46-196C, five Prime Mi.listers of Canada made 
altogether 153 Ministerial appointments. The number of Japanese Ministers, 
521, appointed by eight Prime Ministers in the sane period is more than 
three tines as many as the Canadian appointments. There were about 20 
to 24 members in each Canadian Cabinet in the 23~27ear period.
On the other hand, five hundred and twenty-one Japanese Ministers 
were appointed to approximately seventeen posts in each Cabinet in the 
same period. This means that the average term of Ministers in Japan is
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only 9 months, while that of Canadians is 3 years and 5 months.
In the period 1946-1958, there were seven Secretaries of State 
for External Affairs, eight Ministers of Finance, seven Ministers of
27
Trade and Commerce and seven liinisters of national Defence in Canada.
In Japan, in the same period, the number of these Ministers is sometimes
double and triple: fourteen Foreign Ministers, fourteen Ministers of
Finance and twenty-three Ministers of International Trade and Industry.
Even the National Defence Agency, which was established as late as 1952,
has been presided over by twenty-two Directors General, vrho also held
28
the title of Minister of State.
The average terras of not only Cabinet Ministers in general, but 
also those Ministers most related to foreign and defence policies, differ 
greatly between Canada and Japan. The average terms for Foreign Minister, 
Minister of Finance, Trade and Commerce Minister and Minister of National 
Defence (or Director General of the Defence Agency) are 39 months, 34 
months, 39 months and 39 months repectively in Canada, compared with 19 
months, 19 months, 12 months and 9 months respectively in Japan.
In addition to the longevity of Canadian Ministers, they had a 
higher level of education. In particular, amcng the seven Secretaries 
of State for External Affairs, six had more than one university degree. 
Three were university professors, and the other four were: lecturer at
a university, lawyers (2), and financier. Although the level of education 
is lover among other Ministers, seven out of twenty-seven Ministers in 
the other three Departments had experience in university teaching. . Five 
others practised law. Those lacking any university degree comprised a 
a fairly small minority.
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TABLE 7.
The Number of liinisters in Postwar Cabinets of Canada and Japan.
Canada
Prime Ilinister Period Number of liinisters
N.L. Mackenzie Kinp Oct. 1935 - Nov. 1948 25 (since 1945)
Louis S. St. Laurent Nov. 1948 - June 1957 32
John G. Diefenbaker June 1957 - April 1953 34
Lester B. Pearson April 1963 - April 196G 34
Pierre E. Trudeau Arril 1968 24 (up to end of
_______1968)
Total 153
Japan
Prime Ilinister 
Shiperu Yoshida, 
Tetsu Natay ana 
Hitoshi Ashida 
Shiperu Yoshida,
tl
If
It
1st.
2nd.
3rd.
4th.
5th.
Period Nunbei
May 1946 - May 1947 24
May 1947 - March 1948 21
March 1948 - Oct. 1943 17
Oct. 1948 - Feb. 1949 16
Feb. 1949 - Oct. 1952 39
Oct. 1952 - May 1953 21
May 1953 - Dec. 1954 25
"  101
of Ministers
Ichiro Ilotoyana, 1st.
" 2nd.
" 3rd.
Tanzan Ishibashi 
Mobusuke ICishi, 1st.
" 2nd.
Ilayato Ikeda, 1st.
" 2nd.
" 3rd.
Dec. 1954 - March 1955 
March 1955 - Nov. 1955 
Nov. 1955 - Dec. 1956
Dec. 1956 - Feb. 1957 
Feb. 1957 - June 1958 
June 1958 - July 1960
July I960 - Dec. 1950 
Dec. 1960 - Dec. 1963 
Dec. 1963 - Nov. 1964
J.O
19
18
55
18
35
35
70
20
49
36
105
Eisaku Sato, 1st.
" 2nd.
" 3rd.
Nov. 1964 - Feb. 1967 
Feb. 1967 - Nov. 1968 
Nov. 1968 -
62
48
110 (ur to Nov. 
1968)
Total 521
Source: Canada Year Boo!:, 1945 - 1968; Ilainichi Nenkan, 1966 and 1969.
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Compared with Canadian liinisters, Japanese Ministers have a 
lower level of education. Although anon" altogether 71 liinisters, there 
was only one lacking a university degree, those with nore than one degree 
are very few. Among these 71 Ministers, there were two second Bachelor’s 
degrees, two Master’s degrees and two Doctor’s degrees.
As far as appointment of Ministers is concerned, it seens to be 
nuch nore efficient in Canada than in Japan. Japanese Ministers have 
often been appointed without consideration to their experience or know­
ledge in a particular field, and furthermore, higher appointments are
given to those most often elected to the Diet and those loyal in support-
29
ing factional leaders. In the past ten years, a long career as Diet man 
(at least five terms) has been the most important criterion of a Minister.
Canadian Ministers, on the other hand, have been comparatively 
more appropriately appointed and consideration seems to be given to 
their previous experience or s^udy. As for their appointment, the 
Canadian Frine Minister is required to take religious and regional 
representation into consideration, as well, —  a point with which the 
Japanese Prime Minister does not have to be concerned. However, the 
qualification of special skill, experience and education is still one 
of the most important criteria of a Canadian Minister.
Comparing these Ministers of Canada and Japan in these terns, it 
is evident that Canadian Ministers have nuch longer terms in office, 
higher education and more appropriate appointment than the Japanese 
counterparts. This means that Canadian Ministers are far better able 
to participate in the policy-making process, whereas in Japan, the 
senior officials are more influential in the process. Since Japanese
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senior officials are career men who often have narrow views biased 
towards their specialities? national policies nade under these conditions 
ultimately lack flexibility and breadth.
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The People and Opposition Parties
Both in Canada and Japan a foreign policy is a Cabinet decision, 
however different the influence of senior officials may be in the foreign 
policy-making process between the two. The Cabinet must explain foreign 
policies to the House and to the people to secure support for them. It 
must represent public opinion in external and internal policies as 
much as possible.
However, it is not uncommon for a gap to exist between govern­
ment policy and public opinion. The political representation of 
Canada and Japan may be roughly divided into three parts: the distri­
bution of seats by parties in the House; the support of parties by the
people (shown in election results and various popularity polls); and
30
public opinion on foreign policy issues.
The gap between the government and the people very often reflects 
a difference between the first and the third parts. Nevertheless, it is 
important to know what this difference is. To know the difference is to 
be aware when the people feel that their present comfortable life is 
endangered— -this is the time when a political crisis takes place.
One of the means to determine the difference is the public 
opinion poll. In Canada, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion 
takes public opinion polls in virtually every field. Canada’s 
Government and Department of External Affairs, however, have neither 
the proper channels of communication with the public nor the facilities 
for the systematic study of public opinion on foreign policy. "In the 
past," says R. Barry Farrell, "the attitude within the Government 
concerning Canadian public opinion seemed to be associated 
with the assumption that there were wide areas of foreign policy for
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which the Canadian public appeared to allow the Government to do whatever
31
it wished within very broad limits."
Today, the information about public demand on foreign and defence
policies cones not only fron the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion,
but also fron such sources as newspapers, academic groups, and other
private organizations. For example, the House of Commons Standing
Committee on External Affairs and National Defence,the most important
committee for members of the House of Commons in international relations,
had many witnesses, the majority of then coming from outside the govern- 
32
nent. The Department of External Affairs and the government as a whole,
are now trying to ameliorate the accusation formerly voiced of their
aloof attitude to the people.
In Japan, one example of crisis caused by too great a difference
between the government policy and the public demand occurred when the
Kishi Cabinet was forced to resign, after passing the renewal of the
Security Treaty with the U.S. in 1960. This incident resulted in the
establishment of an independent Public Information Unit in the Prime
Minister’s Office in July, 1960. The Unit has put more stress, among
other things, on public opinion of special issues that the government is
33
about to make or has made a decision on.
In addition, Japanese nation-wide newspapers also take public 
opinion polls on general as well as special issues. Unlike Canadian 
newspapers, at least three newspapers in Japan--Asahi ohinbun, Ilainichi 
3hinbun, and Yoniuri Shinbun— are quite capable of analyzing the public 
opinion shown in their own opinion poll results.
However, as far as the communication between the Ilinistry of
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Foreign Affairs and the people is concerned, Japan critically lacks 
meaningful channels of communication. Departmental or governmental 
publications on foreign and defence policies available to the people 
are very limited in terns of quality as well as quantity. Although there 
are an increasing number of publications about party policies on special 
issues, information published by the Japanese Government or Ilinistry is 
hardly knoTm to the people, unless it cones via newspapers or other mass 
media.
Even in the communication system between the government and the
people, the people are, in general, often indifferent to foreign and
defence policies. Particularly in Canada, where there is less national
unification, the people often react neither positively nor negatively to
foreign uolicv issues, unless the government disregards public opinion 
34
too flagrantly.
Both in Canada and Japan, there arc opposition parties, repre­
senting a large part of the people, in Parliament. The concerns and needs 
of a political system today have grown too. fast, too conple:;, and too
specialized for the popularly elected representatives to provide effective
35
control over every foreign and defence policy issue. Nevertheless,
opposition parties are, without a doubt, bodies with the most power to
prevent domination by the government. One means to achieve this is to
gain nore seats in the House.
The two major parties in Canada, the Progressive Conservative
and Liberal Parties, are "alternating in and out.of power in part as the
36
mood of the country,1' sharing a relatively equal balance of power. An 
important aspect of Canada’s political parties, according to J.Il. Uallory,
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is that "at any given time only one party is in tune with a national
mood— and that party is likely to stay in power until the mood changes
37
and leaves it politically high and dry.”
The New Democratic Party (formerly, the Co-operative Commonwealth
Federation), which is a "mass” party compared with "cadre" parties of the
38
Liberals and the Conservatives, has never been the "one party in tune 
with a national mood." As a result, Canada's official opposition has been 
formed either by the Liberal or the Conservative Party. Both Parties, as 
far as foreign and defence policies are concerned, support basically the 
same principles.
In Japan there were, until 1955» numerous conservative parties 
of varying names. In the fall of 1955, the conservative parties (at 
that time there were two, the Liberal and the Democratic Parties) merged 
into a new party-— the Liberal Democratic Party. At the same time, the 
Socialist parties, the Right-wing, the Left-wing, and the Labour Farmer 
Party formed the Japan Socialist Party. In i960, the Democratic Socialist 
Party split off from the Socialist Party, and, in 1964, the religious 
group, the Sokagakkai, established its own party called the Fair Play 
Party. Although these changes have occurred in the Japanese political 
parties, the opposition has been, since 1949, the collective group of 
progressive parties. Before the 1955 merger, there were some conserva­
tive parties other than the majority party, but they could hardly be 
called "the opposition.”
One of the significant differences between the Canadian and 
Japanese oppositions is that, in Canada, the opposition and the govern­
ment stand on basically the same principles of foreign and defence 
policies, whereas the Japanese opposition and the government differ
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fundamentally in ideology.
Secondly, perhaps largely oning to this ideological divergence*
the Japanese Socialist opposition has only once been in pover* and then,
only in a coalition.
Ilore contrast bet-seen the tno countries can be seen in the number 
of seats the respective oppositions occupy. In the past eight general 
elections in Canada, the Liberals have held an average of 49 per cent of
the seats in the House of Commons in comparison with 38 per cent for the
Conservatives. Contrasted with this, the conservatives in Japan, in the 
period 1947-1955, have averaged sixty-seven per cent of the total number 
of seats in the five House of Representatives elections. The progressive 
parties altogether in the sane period held only 28 per cent. Since the
mergers of the LD? and J5P in 1955 up to the recent election in 1969,
the average percentages of the Liberal Democrats and Socialists have been 
60 and 29 respectively. Because of their slight chance of winning pover 
in the Diet and their ideological gap, the opposition in Japan appears to 
have less effect in preventing the government’s domination than the Canadian 
opposition.
lioreover, there always exists a gap between the percentages of 
the seats in the House and of popular vote in elections. The Canadian
Conservative Party has non an average of 36 per cent of the popular vote
in the past eight general elections compared to 38 per cent of the seats, 
while, at the sane time, the Liberal Party has non an average of 42 per 
cent of the popular vote compared to 49 per cent of the seats.
.Among the Japanese parties, too, almost the same gap exists.
In the five elections prior tc the 1955 merger, the conservatives vron
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63 per cent of the popular vote and 67 per cent of the seats, compared
with the progressives (excepting Independents) who won 28 per cent of
the popular vote and 28 per cent of the seats. In the remaining five
elections (1958-1969), the Liberal Democrats, in contrast to winning 60
per cent of the seats, have iron only 53 per cent of the popular vote,
while, in the same period, the Socialists have won 27 per cent compared
to 29 per cent of the seats.
Another important factor is that Canadian opposition party
members often become members of important committees on international
relations. For example, the House of Commons Standing Committee on
ISxternal Affairs, in May 1967, elected a Conservative member for its vice-
chairman and had many other opposition party members among the twenty-four 
40
total. This Committee used to have little to do with the actual formation
of policy, but since the fall of 1968, under its new name, the Standing
Committee on External Affairs and National Defence began to display a
41
"remarkable demonstration of activity."
Unlike Canada’s case, the role of the Japanese opposition party 
members is very restricted in committees which place emphasis on foreign 
and defence policies. As a consequence, the government party, the Liberal 
Democratic Party, dominates proceedings whenever it is willing to pay the 
price of doing so.
Moreover, opposition members in general, have a difficult time 
obtaining detailed information on foreign relations, compared to the 
government party members. The establishment of the Parliamentary Research 
Centre in Ottawa in late 1968 was, in this respect, a great advantage for 
Canadian opposition members. The Research Centre is designed to provide
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non-partisan information and research to any member of Parliament.
Compared *:ith this, Japanese opposition members, in spite 
of their other disadvantages, have, for a Ions time, had a non­
partisan research section in the national Diet Library. This research 
section--the Desearch and Lesislation Deference Bureau— mas designed mith 
a purpose similar to that of the nem Canadian Parliamentary Desearch 
Centre in Cttama.
Talcing all these aspects into perspective, the Japanese oppo­
sition parties are still less influential over the government than 
those in Canada in the formation of foreign and defence policies.
This lach of influence by the opposition may be related to the rather 
narrov and relatively inflexible foreign policy of Japan. Conversely, 
the strong influence of the Canadian opposition tends to make Canada’s 
foreign policy more flexible and much broader.
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TABLE 8
Results of General Elections; Canada (1949-68)
1949 1953 1957 1958
:ieats A B Seats A B Seats A B Seats A B
Progressive
Conservatives 41 29.7 15.6 51 31.0 19.2 112 38.9 42.3 208 53.6 78.5
Liberal 193 49.5 73.7 171 48.8 64.5 105 40.9 39.6 49 33.6 18.5
Net7 Democratic 
(or CCF) 13 13.4 5.0 . 23 11.3 8.7 25 10.7 9.4 8 9.5 3.0
Social Credit 10 2.3 3.8 15 5.4 5.7 19 6.6 7.2 0 2.6 0.0
Others 5 5.1 1.9 5 3.5 1.9 4 2.9 1.5 0 0.7 0.0
Total . 262 100.0 100.0 265 100.0 100.0 265 100.0 100.0 2.65 100.0 100.0
c\N3
1962 1963 1965 1968
Seats A B Seats A B Seats A * B Seats A B
Progressive
Conservatives 116 37.3 43.8 95 32.8 35.8 97 32.4 36.6 72 31.4 27.3
Liberal 100 37.2 37.7 129 41.7 48.7 131 40.2 49.4 155 45.5 58.7
New Democratic 
(or CCF) 19 13.5 7.2 17 13. 6 6.4 21 17.9 7.9 22 17.0 8.3
Social Credit 30 11.7 11.3 24 11.9 9.1 5 3.7 1.9 0 0.8 0.0
Rallienent de 
Creditistes - - - - - - 9 4.6 3.4 14 4.4 5.3
Others 0 0.3 0.0 - - - 2 1.2 0.8 1 0.9 0.4
Total 265 100.0 100.0 265 100.0 100.0 265 100.0 100.0 264 100.0 100.0
Note: A =  Percentages of popular vote; B = Percentages of seats
Source: J. Hurry Beck, Pendulum of Power* Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario (1968).
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Results of General Elections: Japan (1947-1969)
1947 1949 1952 1953 1955
Seats A B Seats A B Seats A B Seats A B Seats A B
Liberal 131 26-9 28.1 - - - 240 47.9 51.4 - - - 112 26.6 24.0
Democratic 121 25.0 26.0 69 15.7 14.8 - - - - - - 185 36.6 39.6
People’s Conservative 29 . 7.0 6.2 14 3.4 3.0 - - - - - - - - -
Democratic Liberal - - - 264 43.9 56.7 - - - - - - - - -
Progressive - - - - - - 85 18.2 18.2 76 17.9 16.3 - - -
Hatoyana Liberal - - - - - - - - - 35 8.8 7.5 - - -
Yoshida Liberal - - - - - - - - - 199 39.0 42.7 - - -
Socialist 143 26.2 30.7 48 13.5 10.3 _ _ «•
Left-wing Socialist - - - - - - 54 9.6 11.6 72 13.1 15.4 89 15.3 19.1
Right-wing Socialist - - - m - - 57 11.6 12.2 66 13.5 14.2 67 13.9 14.3
Labour Farmer - - - 7 2.0 1.5 4 0.7 0.9 5 1.0 1.1 4 1.0 0.9
Communist 4 3.7 0.8 35 9.9 7.5 0 2.6 0.0 1 1.9 0.2 2 2.0 0.4
Others 25 5.4 5.4 17 5.2 3.6 7 2.6 1.0 1 0.4 0.2 OX. 1.3 0.4
Independents 13 5.8 2.8 12 6.6 2.6 19 6.8 4.1 11 4.4 2.4 6 3.3 1.3
Total 466 100.0 100.0 466 100.0 100.0 466 100.0 100.0 466 100.0 100.0 467 100.0 100.0
1958 1960 1963 1967 1969
Seats A 3 Seats AXX B Seats A B Seats A B Seats A B
Liberal Democratic 287 57.3 61.5 296 57.5 63.3 283 54.7 60.6 . 277 48.3 57.0 288 47.7 59.2
Socialist 166 32.9 35.5 145 27.5 31.0 144 29.0 30.8 140 27.9 28.8 90 21.4 18.5
Democratic Socialist - - - 17 8.7 3.6 23 7.4 4.9 30 7.4 6.2 31 7.7 6.4
Communist 1 2.6 0.6 3 2.9 0.6 5 4.0 1.0 5 4.8 1.0 14 6.8 2.9
Fair Play - - - - - m - 25 5.4 5.1 47 10.9 9.7
Others 1 0.7 0.2 1 0.3 0.2 0 0.2 0.0 0 0.2 0.0 0 0.2 0.0
Independents 12 6.0 2.6 5 2.8 1.0 12 4.8 2.5 9 5.5 1.9 16 5.3 3.3
Total 467 100.0 100.0 467 100.0 100.0 467 100.0 100.0 486 100.0 100.0 486 100.0 100.0
Note: A = Percentages of popular vote; B = Percentages of seats.
Source: Robert Hard, Japan’s Political System, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. (1967), and 
Asab-i Bhimbun, December 28, 1969.
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b. The First Security Treat}?- between
Japan and the U«3.
II. The Second Period (1957-1963)
a. The Conclusion of. 1'OFAD
b. The Itenexral of the Security Treaty
III. The Third Period (1966-1959)
a. The Senetral of 1IOPJO and 1TAT0
b. The Automatic intension of the
Security Treaty
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Japan and Canada provide a good contrast with each other in many 
respects— geography, population, history, and political culture* Kow- 
ever, in the postwar period, both countries share close relations with 
the U.S., particularly in terns of military co-operation.
In the late Forties and early Fifties, Canada was one of the 
strongest nations in the Uest, whereas Japan*s dream of establishing "a 
Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” collapsed, and the country fell 
under the control of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Fowers. Under 
these circumstances, the conditions of joining in the military alliance 
with the U.S. were entirely different. By fostering the idea of NATO, 
a multilateral alliance, the Canadian political leaders sought to bring 
North America into an alliance with western Europe, in particular with 
Britain and France.
On the other hand, while Japan had undergone complete reconstruc­
tion by way of Uestemization fcr democratization in another sense), it 
had no choice but to join a bilateral military alliance with the U.S. 
Japan*s alliance with the U.S. was hastened into being and strengthened 
by Maofs announcement that he would form the Peking Government and by 
the outbx*eak of the Korean Uar.
Throughout the Fifties, the revival of western Europe was rapid, 
and, at the end of the decade, Canada was no longer a big power. Concomi­
tant with its reduced importance in NATO, this vast and rich land was 
threatened by possible Soviet air attack over the North Foie. The increa­
sing antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union sparked the begin­
ning of the North America Air Defence Command agreement between the U.S. 
and Canada. Thus, Canada reverted to heavy dependence on the U.S.,
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from which it previously had been most anxious to escape.
As for Japan’s alliance with the U.S., external and internal con­
ditions were quite different from Canada’s. Instability in the Far 
Eastern and Southeast Asian regions continued in the Fifties, at the 
time Japan was making a comeback as an economically powerful country.
The more Japan’s economy grew stable and expanded, the more it became 
necessary for the U.S. to pay attention to Japan. Consequently, the 
unequal military alliance between the two changed to one of mutual co­
operation in security and economy. In contrast wmth Canada, Japanese 
political leaders were still reluctant to assume increasing responsibility 
for peace and prosperity in East Asia.
In the Sixties, the U.S. domination in NATO and NOEAD continued,
while, at the same time, Canada’s strategic role in both alliances was 
gradually reduced. Although Canada became less influential over European 
affairs and gradually decreased in military strength, expenditures on 
modern expensive weapons did not decrease proportionally. Nonetheless, 
at the end of the Sixties, it has decided to remain in the U.S dominated 
alliances.
Japan has been expanding in military strength rather significantly, 
but its tremendous economic growth is incomparable. At the end of this
decade, Japan’s GNP ranked third in the x?orld. Its military strength is
one of the largest in the East Asian region, including Communist China. 
Economically, Japan is a giant among nations.
The military alliance between the U.S. and Japan does not take 
the one-man command system under the direction of the U.S., as found in 
NATO and NORAD. The U.S. supervisional service in the Japanese armed
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forces has been greatly reduced, whereas Canada*s forces have become 
almost integrated as a snail part of the U.S. military forces.
These trends in Canada-U.S. and Japan-U.S. military relations 
can be examined in three periods: (1) 1947-1953, (2) 1957-1963, (3) 1966
1969. The first period centers on the conclusion of NATO and the first 
Security Treaty. The second period deals with the exchange of the NORAD 
agreement and the conclusion of the second Security Treaty. The last 
period focuses on the renewal and automatic extension of NORAD and NATO, 
and the automatic extension of the Security Treaty.
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THE FIRST PERIOD (1947-1953)
The Conclusion of MATO
(1) The Government Policy
One year after the end of the Second World War, the western
Allied powers in Europe drastically reduced their forces. While the
Soviet armed forces remained virtually unchanged at more than four million
men, the U.S., Britain and Canada, the three strongest Allied powers,
reduced their total number of men under arms from five million to less
than one million. The western Allies, thus, were outnumbered by the Soviet
Union four to one in 1946. It took the West more than one year and a great
1
effort on the part of the British Prime Minister to react to the Communist 
threat in the region.
In March 1947, the Anerican President finally asked Congress for 
four hundred million dollars to assist Greece and Turkey against the 
threat of Communism. At this time, the U.S. was not considering involve­
ment in the political affairs in Europe, but rather economic aid. The 
economic aid motive was further heightened by the establishment of a 
European Recovery Programme (the Marshall Plan).
Unfortunately, the implementation of the Plan played a contribu­
ting part to splitting Europe into east and west. The Plan, which also 
offered aid to the countries of eastern Europe, was refused by the Soviet
Union. At this time, Canada began its "crusade" for a North Atlantic 
3
Treaty.
In early 1948, at the National Liberal Federation, Prime Minister 
Mackenzie King supported the British view that it was an urgent necessity
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to rally the forces of Western civilisation to stem further encroach­
ment of the Soviet tide in Europe. ’’Force has not in itself*" said the
Prime Minister, "the power to create better conditions. But a measure
4
of security is the first essential."
The great step taken by Mackenzie King towards collective defence,
however, came only after persuasion from senior officers in the Department
5
of External Affairs. After heavy involvement in the Mar, the Prime 
Minister was deeply pessimistic and began to retreat to his pre-war 
isolationism.
Only a month after the Prime Minister*s speech, the Soviet Union
supported the Communist coup d*etat in Czechoslovakia. Not only did this
6
incident hasten the conclusion of the Brussels Treaty between Britain,
France and the Benelux countries, it also convinced the Canadian Secretary
of State for External Affairs, Louis St. Laurent, to organize a collective
defence force in which Canada and the U.S. would participate. On the
topic of allying western Europe with North America, Louis St. Laurent
spoke in the House of Commons on April 29, 194S, as follows:
One thing we must constantly keep in mind as we approach this 
fateful decision is that the western European democracies are 
not beggars asking for our charity. They are allies whose 
assistance we need in order to be able to defend ourselves 
successfully and our beliefs. Canada and the United States 
need the assistance of the western European democracies just 
as they need ours.7
To seek a regional defence within the framework of the North Atlantic
community became a firm governmental policy.
8
After the Vandenberg Resolution was passed by the U.S. Congress 
in June 1948, negotiations between the Brussels Treaty powers, the U.S. 
and Canada began in Washington. The negotiations at the ministerial
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level took a full eight months before arriving at the final draft of the 
treaty.
During lengthy negotiations, the scope of alliance came into
question. While the U.S. and the European countries were primarily
interested in economic aid, Canada urged that the North Atlantic Treaty
9
cover the widest possible ground. Lester Pearson, External Affairs
Minister, expressed his ideas on the alliance in the'House of Commons:
In the past, alliances and leagues have been formed to meet 
emergencies and have been dissolved as the emergencies vanished.
It must not be so this time. An Atlantic union must have a 
deeper meaning and deeper roots. It must create conditions for a 
kind of co-operation which goes beyond the immediate emergency. 10
With this in mind, Canada fought for the incorporation of Article
2, which dealt with political institutions and economic co-operation,
11
into the Treaty.
The North Atlantic Treaty was finally concluded by thirteen 
North American and western European countries in Washington on April 4, 
1949, and ratified in Parliament on April 29, 1949.
(2) The Opposition and the Public
On March 28, 1949 the draft of the North Atlantic Treaty was
first brought before the Parliament of Canada. In spite of the Liberal
Government*s late submission to the House, George Drew, Leader of the
Opposition, expressed the Conservative Party*s view that they approved
12
the draft wholeheartedly. Traditionally in favour of Britain and less 
in favour of the U.S., the Conservative Party accepted the Liberal 
Governments policy. Since Britain had diminished in power relative
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to the U.S. in the postwar period, Canada, threatened by U.S. control,
13
desperately needed a counterweight to it. Under these circumstances, the 
government's call to bring the U.S. into the alliance with Europe, in 
particular, with Britain and France, was "wholeheartedly" accepted by 
the opposition.
The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation also supported the
government*s policy. The National President and Leader of the Party,
M.J. Coldwell, went as far as saying he would resign if the Party did
not support the Treaty, even though CCF provincial organizations in
14
Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and British Columbia opposed it.
In the ten months between July, 1948 and April, 1949, not much was
known by the Canadian public about what had been going on behind the
scenes. However, the political leaders predicted that "the public would
be much more ready to support a treaty with a constructive aim than a
15
mere military alliance." This prediction won great support from the 
Canadian voters in the June 1949 election, increasing the Liberal seats 
from 125 in 1945 to 193 and its popular vote from 40.9 per cent in 1945 
to 49.5 per cent.
(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.
It was not considered that the conclusion of the North Atlantic
Treaty would increase Canadian defence expenditures, but rather reduce
then, since the Treaty would result in a "pooling of the defence forces
of the allies Tdiich would be more efficient than unco-ordinated defence 
16
forces." Contrary to expectation, the defence e:;penditures increased
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from $385 million in 1949 to $1»SS2.5 million in 1952*
The main factor for the increase of the budgetary e:ipenditures
of defence was not membership in NATO* but rather involvement in the 
17
Korean 'Jar. However, Canada*s rearmament, required by the conclusion
of the Treaty, accounted for a large part of the e:cpenditures.
In addition to this, Canada*s military co-operation with the U.S.
was revived in October, 1949, when the Permanent Joint Board on Defence
decided to initiate a new programme for reciprocal military procurement.
One year later, having been stimulated by the outbreak of the Korean Uar
in Hay, 1950, the two governments affirmed the decision to develop co-
18
operation in production of military essentials.
The imbalance of this co-operation was revealed in the early
1950*s. The American purchases in Canada amounted to $100 million in
1951, which was five times more than Canada originally anticipated. It
reached as much as $300 million in the succeeding fiscal year. However,
Canada spent $850 million on defence purchases in the U.S. in less than
19
two years (April 1, 1951 to December 31, 1952).
Furthermore, the drastic increase in defence purchases led the 
Canadian Government to establish a new Department of Defence Production. 
The imbalance of Canadian purchases from the U.S. showed that the mili­
tary co-operation night increase Canada*s heavy economic dependence on 
the U.S.
Canada*s circumstances in the period between the end of the 
Second Uorld Uar and the end of the Korean Uar provide a sharp contrast 
with those of Japan. Canada was not only on the victors* side, but 
also was the third strongest power among the western Allies at the end
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of the War when Japan suffered total destruction and control by SOAP.
Canada had been, in history and in culture, closely related to 
the U.S., Britain and France. Through these relations, it strove in 
its own interests to bring these countries into the alliance with North 
America. Japan, on the other hand, had no choice but to accede to the 
alliance with the U.S. In this period, international as well as domes­
tic situations differed greatly between Japan and Canada.
The First Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S.
(1) The Government Folicy
The proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan
provided the groundwork for the erection of an "Asian bastion" against
Russian Communism. The U.S., though it had almost complete control over
Japan*s occupation, strongly supported the establishment of Japan*s o^m 
20
armed forces. Formation of self-defence forces was a far cry from the 
SCAP policy of democratization and demilitarization.
While Canada had a chance to ease its heavy dependence on the 
U.S. by e:q?loiting the threat of Communism in Europe, the tense atmosphere 
of the Cold War meant, for Japan, only tightening of U.S.-Japan relations. 
First of all, Japan, unlike Canada, was not an independent and strong 
nation at the time. Secondly, the international situation, particularly 
the establishment of the Peking Government in October* 1949, stimulated 
a closer alliance with the U.S. Thirdly, although Japan*s economy had 
been rapidly recovering, instability was still rife on the political and
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21
social scene. And finally, the Korean Uar, which began before Japan*s 
independence* without a doubt became a main factor forcing it to stay 
militarily allied with the U.S.
When the U.S. was heavily drawn into the Korean Uar, the economic
<"l *"Y
aid to Japan became an oppressive burden. The American intention to ease 
this burden coincided with the evident anticipation of the Japanese 
leaders and of the anxious public to regain their independence from the 
six-year long occupation.
Three years prior to the outbreak of the Korean T7ar, the conserva­
tive government of Japan had already decided to have the U.S. reinforce
23
Japan*s defence, rather than relying upon the United Nations. But there 
were no further developments in this direction until January 1951, when 
U.S. Secretary of State, John Dulles, cane to Japan. The U.S. represen­
tative and the Japanese Government reached an immediate understanding that
"there could be no peace treaty and independence unless Japan*s security
24
was guaranteed."
Unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, the Security Treaty was not a
treaty of mutual security. Through this Treaty, Japan, unable to afford
rearming itself politically and economically, was to depend on the U.S.
to maintain "certain of its armed forces in and about Japan." The armed
forces stationed in Japan were to be used to counteract not only outside
aggression, but also any large-scale disturbances within Japan. However,
throughout the closed negotiations, Japan devoted itself to improving
"close relations and friendship," rather than pressing the U.S. for an
25
automatic provision similar to the one in the North Atlantic Treaty.
Moreover, Article 3 of the Treaty left the disposition of "the
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U.S. troops in and about Japan” to be discussed in administrative agree-
26
nents between the two countries. .There were two main reasons for the
postponement. One was that the matter concerned was "mainly of a purely
technical nature,” and ”a considerable amount of time would be lost" in
reviewing them with the Americans— time which Japan could ill afford,
because it might "let slip the opportunity presented to Japan to conclude
27
an early peace treaty." The other reason was that
the same sort of talks were then in progress between the United 
States and the nations of western Europe for the stationing of 
United States forces in those countries in accordance with the 
North Atlantic Treaty signed in April 194S, and it seemed to us 
(Japanese) an advantage for both parties if the terms eventually 
to be agreed upon between the United States and the countries of 
western Europe were available for reference, and such a procedure 
was likely to prove advantageous to (Japan).28
Following the example of NATO, Japan replaced, jointly with the
U.S., the Administrative Agreement in 1953, which had originally given
the U.S. extra-territorial rights, with one similar to "the Agreement
between the Partners of the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status 
29
of their Forces."
(2) The Opposition and (die Public
The greatest difference in the process of defence alliance of 
Canada and of Japan was the degree of support the opposition parties 
gave to the government. TJhile in Canada the government^ policy towards 
multilateral military alliance was unanimously upheld by the opposition 
parties, the opposition in Japan stood entirely opposed to the govern­
ment. The governmentfs policy on security did not ease the uncertainty
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of the public who felt U.S. troops in Japan might hinder the course of
its independence, or lead to another war.
On July S, 1950, immediately after the outbreak of the Korean
War, the government announced to the public the establishment of a
Police Reserve of 75,000 men, without informing the Diet. The opposition
31
had no chance to decide or even discuss what the Police Reserve would do. 
This faux pas by the conservative government provoked the opposition to 
strongly oppose the government. In the eyes of the opposition, the esta­
blishment of the Police Reserve was not only unconstitutional, but also
completely against the Potsdam Declaration which called for Japan*s
32
complete demilitarization.
In addition to this, the Liberal Government made another blunder 
which aggravated the opposition*s antagonism toward the conservatives.
This was committed by ratifying the Security Treaty together with the 
Peace Treaty. The opposition found most provocative the preamble, which 
included the phrase: "Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibi­
lity for its own defence against direct and indirect aggression." The 
phrase clearly indicated the possibility that Japan, which had already 
established the Police Reserve, would rush into rearmament. Both opposi­
tion parties and a large number of the Japanese people attacked the govern­
ment, through the mass media and street demonstrations, in an attempt to 
eliminate the phrase from the Treaty.
Disregarding the dissatisfaction of the opposition, the govern­
ment passed the Security Treaty 289 to 71 in the House of Representatives 
and 147 to 76 in the House of Councillors.
Of more significance than the difference of opinion on military
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alliance was the uproar on the natter of the Administrative Agreement. 
Contrary to its promise to follow the example of NATO, which required 
member nations to obtain a simple majority support in Parliament, the 
Japanese Government ratified the Administrative Agreement without follow­
ing the proper procedure of having a simple majority in the Diet, ratio-
33
nalizing that it was not considered a treaty.
In a public opinion poll taken by Kainichi Shinbun on September
13-14, 1951, results showed that the governmentfs policy was in great 
3 A
favour. This did not mean that the public supported its policy "whole­
heartedly, " as Canadian Conservatives did. It seems they did so with 
the feeling of inevitability. It may be reasonably postulated that signs 
of their anxiety over the government policy towards bilateral military 
alliance were revealed in the two election results of 1952 and 1953; the 
Socialist Parties (Left- and Right-wing) increased their seats in the 
lo"er house from AS in 1949 to 111 in 1952 and to 138 in 1953, and the 
percentages of popular votes from 13.5 in 1949 to 21.2 in 1952 and to 
26.6 in 1953.
(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.
Consideration of the possibility of establishing Japari*s own
armed forces started as early as in 1947. Foreign Minister Ashida
daringly added the clause: "In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph . . to the beginning of the second paragraph of
Article 9 of the new Japanese Constitution. By this, he meant that
35
Japan should be able to maintain the right of self-defence.
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However* it was not until the Hew Year of 1950 that General 
MacArthur, SCAP, proclaimed that the new Constitution would not deter 
Japan from establishing its ora self-defence forces. Japan was ordered 
to immediately form a Police Reserve of 75*000 and a Marine Security of 
8*000 men.
Since most of the former Japanese military officers were purged
by SCAP after the Mar, the entire managenentof the Police Reserve during
36
the first half-year cane under the direction of the U.S. commander. From
the beginning, close military co-operation with the U.S. was inevitable.
In spite of the nation’s anti-war sentiment, Japanese youth were attracted
37
by the relatively high wages and the name "Police Reserve."
In the deteriorating situation of the Korean TJar, the new Police
Reserve "naturally" co-operated with the U.S. troops on Japanese soil.
Hot until April, 1952* was the 8,000 strong Maritime Guar-d formed. It,
too, came under the American command, borroT.7ing all equipment from the
3G
U.S.. Moreover, in August, 1952, a Security Agency was appended to the 
Prime Minister’s Office. At the same time, the Police Reserve increased 
to 110,000. Both the Police Reserve and the Maritime Guard were com­
pletely modernized, and their budgetary expenditures were increased from 
$86.1 million to $164.3 million.
Further steps to rearm Japan we re taken in 1953, when the Korean 
armistice came into effect. The end of the War resulted in a decrease
in special war procurements from the U.S. to Japan ($809 million in
39
1953; $596 million in 1954). The Japanese economy once again became 
very unsteady. It was at this time that the U.S. announced its plan 
to include Japan in the Mutual Security .Assistance programme (MSA).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
79
After lengthy and heated negotiations, the Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement (1IDA) between Japan and the U.S. was signed on llarch 8, 1954.
Through this Agreement, "special procurements" stayed at the 
500 million-dollar level throughout the rest of the 1950*s. In addition 
to the procurements, military aid (in the form of gifts) and economic 
aid (mainly in loan form), which had been cut out in 1953, gradually 
increased. Most of the new equipment for the National Security Force 
(this had developed from the Police Reserve in 1952, with the addition 
of a Maritime Security of 6,000 men) was provided by the U.S.
Only three months after the conclusion of IDA, the Security
Agency further evolved into the National Defence Agency. The Security
Force (army) and the Maritime Guard became the Ground Self-Defence Force
and the Maritime Self-Defence Force. Moreover, a new Air Self-Defence
Force was added, which was filled by officers who had been trained in
40
the U.S. Air Force.
While Canada e:iploited the multilateral alliance in order to 
ease the encroaching control of the U.S., Japan was drawn increasingly 
into closer relations with the latter. It almost appeared as if the 
Pacific Mar had never e::isted.
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TABLE 1 0 .
Total Budgetary E:cpenditures and Military Expenditures
(1951 - 1957)
 In nillions of U.S. dollars
Canada Japan
Year Total(A) Uilitary(B) B/A Total(A) Ililitary(B) B/A
1951 2,711 731 27% 2,083 352 17%
1952 3,439 1,352 39 2,428 507 21
1953 4,054 1,342 45 2,825 348 12
1954 4,066 1,733 43 2,891 375 13
1955 3,996 1,778 40 2,828 378 13
1956 4,143 1,652 40 2,970 397 13
1957 4,532 1,667 37 3,299 425 13
Note: B includes e:q?erises of National Defence* Defence Production 
(or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are 
calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent 
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctua­
tion.
Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1952-58,
The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime Minister*s 
Office, Nihon Tokei Een*kan, 1962 and 1963, Tokyo.
TABLE 11.
Military Strength, 1951 - 1957
Canada Japan
Year Total CPJT CRA CPvAF Total MSD? GSDF ASDF
1951 63,427 11,032 34,986 22,359 75,000 - 75,000 -
1952 95,394 13,508 49 , 273 32,611 116,038 6,038 110,000 -
1953 104,427 15,546 43,453 40,423 117,000 7,000 110,000 -
1954 112,529 16,955 49,978 45,596 144,738 8,000 130,000 6,738
1955 117,005 18,806 49,447 48,750 166,000 8,500 150,000 7,500
1956 117,172 19,000 47,632 50,540 179,000 10,500 160,000 8,500
1957 119,414 19,815 47,938 51,661 184,500 15,000 160,000 9,500
Source: Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report, 1952-53, 
The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, 
Tokyo (1969).
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THE SECOND PERIOD (1957-1953)
The Conclusion of NORAD
(1) The Government Policy
The diplomacy of the Liberal Government of Canada based on 
multiplicity of relationship reached its heyday in the middle of the 
1950*s. Canada expanded its prestige as a peace-keeping mediator not 
only between the great powers, but also between the Nest and the East, 
through the arena of the United Nations. As a member of both NATO and 
the U.N., it seemed Canada could provide a good channel of communication 
between the U.S. and Eritain and France, the two strongest powers in
41
western Europe.
However, this heyday was short-lived. International circum­
stances in the late 1950*s gradually became less favourable to Canada 
than they had been in the 1940*s and early 1950*s. European countries 
steadily regained their power; newly-born states in the Afro-Asian region 
were inclined to consider Canada as a "bourgeois" western power; Japan 
had risen from ashes to revive in the Pacific; China expanded its sphere 
of political influence throughout the world.
After a hegemony of more than tuo decades, the Liberal Government 
was replaced by the Progressive Conservative Party. Unlike the Democratic 
Liberals* succession to the Liberal Government in the early 1950*s in 
Japan, the changeover in Canada was less easily accepted by the bureau­
cracy. In Japan, no natter which conservative party came to power, it 
had little trouble co-operating with the bureaucracy. Unlike Japan's 
case, the Conservative Government under John Diefenbaker found it
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difficult to see eye to eye vith the Liberal oriented higher officials 
of the Department of External Affairs.
Subsequently* Canada*s contribution to NATO became less military
42
and more political and economic. As far as the North American continent
was concerned, however, increasingly sophisticated military equipment
posed a greater threat from the Soviet Union via the North Pole.
The joint air defence commands between the U.S. and Canada had 
43
been established in 1954. The integration of the military co-operation
with the U.S. was continued by the Conservative Government under John
Diefenbaher. With a firm understanding of the operational control of the
continental air defence, Prime Minister Diefenbaher accepted that "the
Liberal Government had, before the general election of June 10, 1957, all
44
but formally given its approval to the NORAD agreement."
The Diefenbaher Government had no choice but to agree to the
establishment of the North American Air Defence Command (NGRAD) on 
September 12, 1957. However, detailed agreements for NORAD were post­
poned until after the twenty-fourth election of 1958.
The Conservative Party, contrary to the results of the final poll
45
taken by the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion, widely increased its
seats in the House of Commons from 112 in 1957 to 208, leaving only 49
seats for the Liberals. The 208 majority was unprecedented in Canada.
Within two months after the greatest victory ever of the Conser­
vatives, steps were quickly taken towards reaching agreement on KORAD.
On May 12, 1958, the Canadian Ambassador to Washington, H.A.. Robertson, 
presented the U.S. Government with the proposal of the eleven principles 
on NORAD. According to the proposal, the two countries were to agree
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on the "necessity for integration of operational control of Canadian 
and United States air defences." The system was to provide for "authori­
tative control of all air defence weapons which must be enployed against
an attacker." The purpose of the agreement was "to counter the threat
46
and to achieve maximum effectiveness of the air defence system." NORAD
would not hinder the existence of the Canada-U.S. Regional Planning Group
of arrangements for the air defence of North America. The Commander-in-
Chief NORAD and his Deputy Commander would not be from the sane country.
This proposal was accepted on the same day by the U.S. Government.
To fulfil the purpose of the agreement. Prime Minister Diefenbaher was
obligated to announce, xrithin four months, a large expenditure for the
47
modernization of Canada*s NORAD equipment. Moreover, the government had
to take steps to face the nuclear age, which had been rapidly advanced
by the Soviet Union and the U.S. Manned aircraft became notably less
effective and the U.S. wanted t'.e Canadian component of NORAD to be
48
nuclear-armed, just as the American one was.
The Prime Minister hinted at the eventual necessity for nuclear
49
warheads as early as September 1958. However, the mysterious and indeci­
sive Diefenbaher policy on defence and foreign affairs continued even 
through the Cuban missile crisis of October* 1962— the culmination of 
nuclear anxiety between the U.S. and the Soviet Union— until the
50
Conservative Government was replaced by the Liberals in April, 1963.
The following brief statements of Diefenbaher reveal his indeci­
sive attitude towards nuclear weapons:
. . .  by the 1960*s manned aircraft . . . will be less effective . . .
It has therefore been decided to introduce the Bomarc guided 
missile (which) can be used with either a conventional high explo-
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sive warhead or a nuclear warhead.
(September 23, 1959)
Eventually Canadian forces nay require certain nuclear wea­
pons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective . . . .  the 
necessary weapons can be made available for Canadian defence 
units if and when they are required.
(House of Commons, Canada 
January IS, 1960)
If and when the Canadian government should decide to equip 
its forces with nuclear weapons those weapons would be under 
Canadian control and would be used in Canada only as the 
result of a decision by the Canadian government.
(House of Commons, Canada 
July A, 1960)
Ue have made it perfectly clear that when and if nuclear wea­
pons are required, we shall not accept them unless we have 
joint control.
(House of Commons, Canada 
November 30, 1960)
Ue take the stand . . .  (that) the nuclear family should not 
be increased so long as there is any possibility of disarma­
ment among the nations of the world.
(House of Commons, Canada 
February 26, 1962)
(2) The Opposition and the Public
With confirmation that the Soviet Union now possessed the means 
of striking western Europe and North America, the opposition confronted 
the Diefenbaher Government, urging it to strengthen the military alli­
ance with the European countries and the U.S. The important question 
was whether to possess nuclear weapons.
As early as 1955 the NATO Council decided that the defence of
51
western Europe must be conducted with nuclear warheads. However, the 
question of nuclear weapons did not become a serious issue for Canadians
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until the Soviet Union announced that they had successfully fired an 
inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) on August 26, 1957, and that 
they had sent Sputnik I into orbit on October 4 of the same year.
The superiority of the Soviet Union in offensive missiles gave 
Premier Nikita Khrushchev confidence to deliver ultimata on Berlin in 
late 1958 and mid-196l, to walk out from the U.N. Assembly and Dis­
armament Council in Geneva, and finally, to place missiles in Cuba
52
in 1962.
At the beginning of the nuclear armament race, the Liberal oppo­
sition, by and large, agreed with the Conservative Government. The 
Leader of the Opposition said in the House of Commons, on February 20,
1959:
I . . . agree with the Prime Minister that anything that can 
be done to limit the extension of the manufacture of (nuclear) 
weapons should be done. I welcome his statement these nuclear 
weapons are not to be manufactured in Canada. Nevertheless, 
with regard to the nuclear warheads of Bomarc missiles and 
defensive weapons of that kind, it seems to me that it would 
be quite insupportable . . .  to have Canadian air squadrons _ 
without them and United States squadrons with them.53
Two years later, the opposition, with its own electoral ends in
mind, changed its attitude towards nuclear weapons. The Leader of the
Opposition, supporting the bar>-the-borab movement in Canada, said at the
opening of the National Liberal Party Conference in Ottawa in January, 1961:
. . . (We) should not acquire or use nuclear weapons under any 
kind of national or joint control. The extended possession of 
nuclear weapons by individual nations . . .  will greatly 
increase the difficulty of abolishing all nuclear weapons, and 
will also greatly increase the danger of nuclear war.54
The government gradually moved in the direction of disarmament.
On the other hand, the opposition further reversed its policy on 
nuclear weapons. Paul Hellyer, senior member of the Party and later
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Minister of National Defence in the Pearson Government* said in 
December* 1962:
In order to resolve this dilemma (expensive but ineffective 
Canadian forces) I have come to the conclusion that . . .
Canada should sign a bilateral agreement with the United 
States which will permit the supply of atomic weapons to 
Canadian forces . . .
Annoyed by the governments indecision on possession of nuclear
weapons, the Opposition Leader, supporting the speech of Paul Hellyer*
criticized the government policy. In the House of Commons, on January
25, 1963, he made the following statement:
. . .  (B)oth in NATO and in continental defence (NORAD), the 
Canadian Government has made certain defence pledges and has 
accepted certain defence commitments on behalf of Canada which 
can only be carried out by Canadian forces if nuclear warheads 
are used. . . .  (l)t is humiliating and dishonourable for
Canada to discharge them or put our men in a position to dis­
charge them if they were called to do so in an emergency . . . .
(W)e must be prepared to do the job in that sector until we 
agree to do something else . . .  .56
The trend of Canada*s foreign and defence policies is clearly
illustrated in this example. It is a fact that both government and
57
opposition in Canada are, particularly since the King era, "cadre" 
parties. The bulk of the Japanese opposition parties xras greatly 
restricted by the ideology of pure Marxism, and had little flexibility 
in their policies. But the Canadian opposition has frequently changed 
its policy, based on "a justification of the democratic political process
as such, without any attempt to evaluate the quality of decisions result­
ing from this process in the light of a formulation of the public 
58
interest," but with orientation primarily towards electoral victory.
There was obvious indecision on the issue of nuclear weapons in 
the defence policy on the part of the Conservative Government and the
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Liberal Farty. According to the Gallup Foil, however, the Conservatives 
gradually came into disfavour with the public. Unlike Japan, the 
Canadian public had the advantage of the right to choose between two 
very similar parties.
(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.
The military integration embodied in the KORAD agreement of
1958 extended to defence production. Uhen the plans for the Canadian
60
Ground Environment system (CAGE) and the CF-105 Arrow were cancelled, 
it became imperative that the Canadian defence industry gain access to 
the U.S. defence market. This idea was -welcomed by the U.S., and 
quickly worked on. By September 1958, John Diefenbaher was ready to 
announce that the U.S. Government was now "prepared to work out pro­
duction sharing agreements" with Canada.
Having established a bilateral committee on the matter in 
October, 1958, both governments reached agreement in nid-1959 that "the 
production sharing programme would cover a wide range of United States 
defence programmes in which Canadian industry could establish its
ability to compete with American industry on the basis of technical
61
competence, delivery and price." Canada had become involved with the 
U.S. in defence production long before, but now it reached the point of 
being protected and being taught the technology of defence by the Ameri­
cans. Although Canada was increasingly successful in developing its
62
defence industry in the 1957-62 period, Canada*s deep involvement in the 
military co-operation with the U.S. seems to have put Canada in a more
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difficult position to become independent of U.S. defence policy.
Moreover, in the field of military strategy, the U.S., in the 
period 1958-63, became very dominant in the operational control of 
KORAD, as it had been in NATO. First of all, the KORAD headquarters 
were located at Colorado Springs, Colorado. The post of Commander-in- 
Chief (CINCNORAD) was filled by an American general who owed his first 
responsibility to the U.S. President.
Secondly, CINCNORAD and the majority of officers assigned there
were American. This U.S.-dominated system had the authority to control
all forces, including Canadian forces, assigned to the NORAD defence
system. This authority, with an American CINCKOR.AD at the top* had
included the power of "transfer of forces from one area to another and
63
the crossing of the U.S.-Canada boundary."
Thirdly, since Canada was no longer devoted to developing a 
major weapons system in the military strategy of North American defence, 
it was largely dependent upon the newly developed weapons of the U.S.
Canada, like Japan in the 1950*s, was integrated industrially 
and strategically into the military co-operation with the U.S. Although 
the Canadian and Japanese cases were rather different, both countries 
accepted the integration for mainly economic reasons. For Canada, it 
was to prevent increase of its heavy economic dependence on the U.S., 
by balancing its defence purchases in the U.S. with those of the U.S. 
in Canada; and, for Japan, it was to maintain Japan*s favourable eco­
nomic relations with the U.S. in general. Both entered into military 
co-operation under U.S. dominance, diligently attempted to alter it, 
but reverted to the former position of being dominated by the U.S.
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The Renewal of the Security Treaty
(1) The Government Policy
The feeling of helplessness the Japanese people had towards the
Security Treaty of 1950 gradually changed to an antagonism to the nresence
64
of the U.S. bases in Japan by the end of the Fifties. This change of 
attitude helped the progressives (Socialists, Communists and other minor 
opposition parties) increase their popular vote as well as the seats 
they held in the Diet.
To confront this gradual and steady increase of the power of 
the opposition, a complicated struggle for hegemony among the conservatives 
followed, which resulted in their unification within the Liberal Democra­
tic Party (ID?) under Ichiro Katoyama. But, contrary to the conservatives* 
expectation, the general election of 1958 indicated a decrease for then 
of 5.4 per cent in popular votes and 10 seats.
In external affairs, the Hatoyama Government began to normalize 
Japan*s relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had refused 
to sign the Peace Treaty at San Francisco, and constantly vetoed Japan*s 
entrance into the U.N. After the death of Stalin and the termination of
the Korean hostilities, signs of "a less unfriendly Russian attitude"
65
appeared.
It was at this tine that the Hatoyama Government reverted to a 
less pro-American or more neutral policy. By December, 1956, the Soviet 
Union finally allowed Japan’s admission to the world organization.
However, the normalization policy of Hatoyama cost him his Prime 
Ministership. Hatoyama was replaced by Tanzan Ishibashi a few days 
after Japan’s admission to the U.N. His position as Prime Minister
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lasted only two months, because of ill health. In late February, 1957, 
ITobusuke Kishi, who had been famous for his pro-/merican sentiment, 
succeeded Ishibashi.
Since the conclusion of the first Security Treaty, Japan’s 
economy rapidly increased in terms of G1TP: $16,900 million in 1952, 
$22,900 nillion in 1955, and $28,900 million in 1957. Japan’s economic 
revival on the international scene and unsatisfactory state of military 
domination by the U.S. created a confused feeling among the Japanese 
majority. It made them wonder whether Japan would ever be able to 
recover its economic power without U.S. military protection, or whether
Japan could continue its economic relations xrith the U.S. without the
66
U.S. military bases in Japan.
Under these domestic and foreign circumstances, the Kishi
Government proceeded with the revision of the first Security Treaty
between Japan and the U.S. In Washington in June, 1957, Prime Minister
Kisni expressed his governments desire to strengthen its defence forces
in order to fight Communism. To carry through this intention, Kishi felt
the 1952 Security Treaty should be revised to coincide with the "new era"
67
of Japan-U.S. relationships. Although the U.S - negotiators in Washington 
did not agree with the revision of the Treaty at that time, the American 
attitude rapidly grew more flexible in the next year.
The Kishi Government’s policy on a new Security Treaty stood on
68
four principles. The first was to continue its military alliance with 
the U.S., but to put an end to U.S. intervention in Japan’s domestic 
affairs, allowed by Article I of the Security Treaty of 1952.
The second principle was to include a date when a new Treaty
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should be terminated, with or without a notice of denunciation by either 
of the partners. The old Treaty was to be terminated only when the U.S. 
and Japanese Governments agreed that an alternative security arrangement 
had been found.
Thirdly* Japan desired clarification as to whether the U.S. would 
commit itself to defend Japan, and that it would consult with Japan 
beforehand, regarding the use of Japanese bases for military operations 
outside Japan or before introducing nuclear weapons into Japan. This 
principle was an attempt to justify Japan’s co-operation with the U.S., 
even when Japan was not under attack, though it was. unconstitutional. 
However, the right of self-defence was not against the Constitution.
The last principle was to promote, through a new Treaty, 
economic co-operation between the two countries. This was a completely 
new principle in the Japanese-U.S. alliance, but one most stressed during 
the negotiations. The Prime Minister put much emphasis on the new 
economic aspect of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
The government seemed to have learned the importance of the
69
economic aspect, especially from Canada’s experience. Canada, as 
mentioned earlier.* negotiated industriously to have incorporated into 
the North Atlantic Treaty, /article 2, d^iich dealt with the economic 
co-operation between the Treaty partners. Furthermore, Canada’s devotion 
to the economic and political aspects of an alliance made Canada the most 
prestigious mediator in the Uest, if not in the world.
On January 6, 1960 the final draft of a new Treaty was completed, 
and, on the nineteenth of the same month, the Prime Minister flew to 
Washington to sign the Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security between
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Japan and the U.S. Abiding by the Charter of the U.N., the four prin­
ciples on which the Kishi Government rad based the revision of the first
70
Treaty, were largely accepted by the U.S.
(2) The Opposition and the Public
Japanese opposition to the military alliance with the U.S. had
very different sources than those of Canada. Uhile Canada’s opposition
was mainly because Canadians felt that the defence system was ineffective
and very expensive, the Japanese opposition had its sources in the
71
cultural and ideological differences between the U.S. and Japan. Three 
most significant factors in the Japanese opposition to the military alli­
ance with the U.S. seem to have been: (1) the presence of foreign
bases in Japan, (2) the difference of race and culture— a factor 
antagonistic to the Japanese nationalistic feeling, (3) the strong 
opposition of the U.S. to Communist ideology— an ideology on which the 
Japanese opposition bases its principles.
The anti-U.S. feeling in Japan brought about an unexpected
upheaval in the opposition, stimulated by the crimes of American service-
72
men against Japanese civilians. However, when the time to decide to revise
or abolish Japan’s military alliance with the U.S. arrived, the Japanese
73
people became more and more uncertain. It is very difficult to determine 
what made the people more confused about this special issue, but too 
great a difference betw’een the policies of the government and the 
opposition could account for one reason. Uhile in Canada the Conserva­
tive Government and the Liberal opposition shared basically the same
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policy, there was, in Japan, a radical difference between the Liberal
Democratic Govemirjent and the opposition parties headed by the Socialist
Party. This great difference of opinion night have frightened an
’’unspecified majority" into thinking that there could be complete chaos
if the opposition parties were supported.
Uhen the Joint Statement to revise the first Treaty was
announced by the Japanese and .American Governments in September 1958,
the opposition parties had already gone be2rond the point of compromise,
74
talcing the stand of "absolute opposition." The policy of "absolute
opposition" focused on four points: the withdrawal of all U.S. bases;
neutrality; establishment of relations with Communist China; and a
peace treaty with the Soviet Union.
However, it was not until late Harch, 1959 that all opposition
parties were united with the purpose of preventing the revision of the
Security Treaty. Because of ideological differences betcreen the Socialists
and Communists, it was difficult to establish the "People's Council for
75
Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty." Even after its establish­
ment on Harch 28, 1959, the differences in view among ideologically
76
organized parties and groups often resulted in clashes and splits.
In the 1958 general election, the newly-formed Socialist 
Party gained 1.2 per cent more seats in the House of Representatives. 
However, the total strength of the opposition parties was only 168 
seats (or 36.3 per cent) against the 287 seats (or 61.5 per cent) the 
conservatives held. Having no chance to defeat the government's policy 
because of their small numbers, both the Socialists and the Communists 
depended on public support outside the Diet to demonstrate their dissatis-
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faction with the government.
The Socialists sought an organized support fron Sohyo (the
General Council of Japanese Labour Unions)* which had about 3.7 million
members. The Communists, too, relied on the Zengakuren (the All-Japan
Federation of Student Self-Government Association), which had already
split-into "mainstream" and "anti-mainstream" groups in 195S.
In addition to the fact that it had a slim chance to defeat
the government’s policy in the Diet, the Socialist opposition was much
77
too preoccupied with the definition of the words in the new Treaty,
although it had already been signed in January, 1960. In February, 1960
a special committee on the new Security Treaty was organised in the
House of Representatives; it debated a total of 150 hours on the new
Treaty. However, the opposition, particularly the Socialists, hoping
to filibuster until the Diet session ended, spent most of the time
demanding a definition of "the Far East" and "previous consultation"
78
used in Article 4.
The diqpute between the Liberal Democratic Government and the
opposition reached a climax on May 19-20, 1960. LTien the Liberal
Democrats, with the exception of some anti-ICishi factions, tried to pass
a 50-day extension of the session, the Diet became a violent battlefield
of Socialists, Communists, Liberal Democrats and the Diet police. After
a lengthy period of fighting, the conservative proposal to extend the
session was passed, and, immediately after that, the new Treaty was
approved without forewarning and debate and in the absence of opposition
79
parties (including some anti-ICishi factions of the IDF).
The complete lack of democracy and peace in the Diet during the
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"May 19 Incident" caused quite a controversy. Almost all the leading
newspapers, magazines, and millions of Japanese people violently attacked
80
the government, but not necessarily the revision of the Security Treaty.
However, the majority of the Japanese mass media again refocused its
attack, this time on the opposition. This reached a crisis in the
political unrest which occurred between June 10 and 19. The first
incident in the continuous violence occurred when Press Secretary
Hagerty and Ambassador MacArthur arrived at Tokyo International Airport
«
on June 10. Thousands of anti-American demonstrators, associated with
the anti-Kishi forces, surrounded their car so that both of them had
to be taken to Tokyo by military helicopter.
The second was the eruption of violence in the vicinity of the
Diet on June 15• Thousands of demonstrators demanded the immediate dis-
81
solution of the Diet and the abolition of the Treaty. Demonstrators 
clashed with the police, causing the first death of a demonstrator and 
an attack by police on some newsmen and university professors.
The third was the government's cancellation of President 
Eisenhower's visit. The Kishi Government was intending to welcome the 
President who was coming to celebrate the centennial of Japanese- 
American friendship, after the ratification of the new Treaty.
These violent activities made the Japanese mass media and 
public criticize the anti-government movement. The violent demonstrations, 
largely supported by the opposition parties, turned the public's senti­
ment against them and in favour of the status quo of the conservative 
government.
In July, i960, Kishi was replaced by the low-postured Prime
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Minister Ikeda. Prime Minister Ikeda stressed economic prosperity 
rattier than the establishment of a strong military power allied with 
the U.S. In November, 1960 the twenty-ninth general election was 
held. The LDP increased its seats to 296, a gain of 9. The JSP decreased 
in popular vote by 5.4 per cent and suffered a loss of 21 seats. The 
reason for this decrease was mainly because of the formation of the DSP, 
which broke away from the JSP early in 1960.
The opposition in Japan, thus, was in an entirely different 
situation from the Canadian opposition in this period. This was probably 
because there was too great an ideological gap between the Japanese 
conservatives and the progressives. It may also have been because party 
politics were not deeply rooted in Japan. It seems that the people voted 
for the LDP on the basis of the personality of the candidates, rather than 
of party policies.
(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.
It was no accident that the U.S. and Japanese Governments agreed 
to incorporate economic co-operation into the new Treaty. In order to 
build up armed forces in Japan, the U.S. military aid (gifts) had 
increased gradually and in 1959 reached $147 million. Special war 
procurements, even after the Korean truce, remained at the 500 million- 
dollar level. The Japanese defence industries increased in productivity 
from $200 million in 1955 to $322 million in 1960. (Table 12)
The Canadian Government reduced its military obligation to equip 
itself with modern weapons, and developed, instead, the Defence Production
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Sharing Programme with the U.S. By producing and exporting military 
equipment, Canada attempted to meet its military obligation in the 
alliance and, at the same time, to offset the economic demand at home.
In other words, it exploited the military alliance in terms of defence 
production.
However, compared with the Canadian example, Japan*s economic 
exploitation of the military alliance with the U.S. did not rely so much 
upon defence production. (Table 12) Rather, Japan took advantage of the 
mutual co-operation of general trade with the U.S. The average three
and a half per cent of Japan*s share in the total of U.S. imports in the
82
1950*s rose to an 8.8 per cent average in the early half of the 1960*s.
From Japan*s point of view, it meant that while it reduced its import
dependence on the U.S. from 37.8 per cent in 1957 to 30.8 per cent in
1963, it increased its exports to the U.S. from 20.9 per cent to 27.6
83
per cent in the same period.
As far as defence production was concerned, in the period down
to the conclusion of the new Treaty, U.S. integration with Japan did
not yet occur. In June, 1957 the first Defence Supplies and Equipment 
84
Programme, which was to be completed by 1960, was introduced by the
Defence Council. It was, however, intended only to fill the vacuum
85
caused by the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japan and to lay the 
foundations for the growth of a military-industrial complex tightly 
bound to the American defence industry.
The American integration of defence production began with the second
Defence Supplies and Equipment Programme of the period 1962-66, which
86
was planned to modernize weapons, including the missile system. This
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five-year programme of $3,611 million included the first Defence
Production Plan. This plan called for the manufacturing of weapons at
home. The main reason for the home-manufactured weapon plan was said to
be to prevent inefficiencies such as late delivery and inferior quality 
G7
of goods.
During the first Production Plan of 1961-64, 43 per cent of the
S3
1,480 million-dollar production was spent on Japanese defence industries. 
In the second plan of the same type (1965-67), the percentage was 
expected to greatly increase. It seems that the real reason for the 
home-manufacture, in this instance, was the intention to reduce Japan’s 
heavy dependence on the American defence industry. In fact, home- 
manufactured airplanes and warships were more expensive than those 
bought from the U.S., and the increase in cost of home manufacturing in 
the first plan was mainly owing to the practice of buying American
89
licences, required in order to nroduce the same defence weapons in Japan.
The more Japan’s defence products were manufactured at home, the
more independent the Self-Defence Forces became. However, the most
important force, the Air Self-Defence Force, was, at least until the end
of the second Defence Programme in 1966, under the command of the U.S.,
90
in spite of the existence of the Burns-Matsumae agreement, which gave the 
ASDF its own command and authority in 1959.
Strategically, the Air Self-Defence Force worked and trained with 
the U.S. Air Force in the sane office and under the same regulations.
The only difference between the two Forces was that regulations were
91
written in Japanese and operation control was often done in Japanese. 
Economically, Japan gradually eased its dependence on the U.S. defence
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industry> but the U.S. still dominated the command system of the Japane 
forces.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
TABLE 1 2 .
Defence Production and its Percentages in GNP, 1954 - 1966
in millions of U.S. dollars
Canada Japan
Year Defence Production DF/GNP Defence Production DP/G2T?
1954 1,007 4.4% 217 1.0%
1955 652 2.6 208 0.9
1956 673 2.4 241 0.9
1957 516 1.7 302 1.0
1953 664 2.2 282 0.9
1959 508 1.6 278 0.7
1960 672 2.0 322 0.7
1961 470 1.3 287 0.5
1962 455 1.2 354 0.6
1963 436 1.1 354 0.5
1964 511 1.2 463 0.6
1965 666 1.4 371 0.4
1966 964 1.8 303 0.3
Note: All figures are calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar 
which is equivalent to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 
regardless of fluctuation.
Total amount of defence production for Canada is the net value 
of all contracts issued by the Department of Defence Produc­
tion, and for Japan is the sum of domestic procurement by 
the National Defence Agency and special procurement by the 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry- Defence 
production usually includes aircraft, ships, tank-automotive, 
weapons, ammunition and explosives, electronics and communica­
tion equipment, fuels and lubricants, clothing and equipage, 
construction, and others.
Source: Canada, Department of Defence Production, Annual Report, 
1954-67, The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Asahi Shimbun Sha,
Jieital, Tokyo (1969); llainichi Shimbun Sha, Mainichi Nen*l;an, 
1969, Tokyo.
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TABLE 1 3 .
Total Budgetary Expendi tures and Military E:cpenditures
(1958'- 1963)
in nillions of U.S. dollars
Canada Japan
Year Total(A) Ifilitary(B) B/A Total(A) Ililitary(B) B/A
1958 4, 754 1,568 33% 3,699 412 11%
1959 5,013 1,348 27 4,153 437 11
1960 5,330 1,432 27 4,842 444 9
1961 5,568 1,437 26 5,732 510 9
1962 6,094 1,532 25 7,102 569 8
1963 6,140 1,494 24 8,456 675 8
Note:B includes eicpenses of National Defence, Defence Production 
(or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are 
calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent 
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctua­
tion.
Source: Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1959-64,
The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime Uinisterts Office, 
Nihon Tokei HenUcan, 1964 and 1968, Tokyo.
TABLE 14.
Hilitary Strength, 1958 - 1963
Canada Jar? an
Year Total CRN CRA CRAF Total HSDF GSDF ASDF
1958 120,848 20,252 48,682 51,914 203,000 18,000 170,000 15,000
1959 120,400 20,300 48,400 51,700 221,000 23,000 170,000 28,000
1960 120,000 20,500 48,000 51, 500 232,000 30,000 170,000 32,000
1961 119,300 20,000 47,800 51,500 233,000 30,000 170,000 33,000
1962 122,500 20,000 50,000 52,500 235,000 24,500 171,500 39,000
1963 123,700 21,700 50,000 52,000 249,500 34,000 171,500 34, 500
Source: Canada, Department of National Defence, Annual Report,1959; 
Asahi Shimbun Sha, Jieitai, Tokyo(1969); The Institute for 
Strategic Studies, Hilitary Balance, London.
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THE THIRD PERIOD (1966-1969)
The Renewal of NORAD and NATO
(1) The Government Policy
Even in the period 1963-1968* when the Liberal Government was 
headed by Lester Pearson, Canada*s position in the NATO and NORAD alli­
ances became less important. Exercising influence through the alliance
92
was hardly enough reason to remain both in NATO and NORAD.
However, Canada*s original intention of creating collective
security under a common alliance framework was maintained in the
alliances in which Canada had been involved. Faithfully adhering to
its commitments to NATO and NORAD, Canada accepted the principle of
53
•'flexible response," which was introduced by the U.S. It left ultimate
control over deterrence of war to the U.S. and acquiesced to its increa-
9 A
sing domination in the alliances.
In spite of its reduced importance in the alliances and its 
acceptance of the "flexible response" principle, the Liberal Government 
added a new dimension to its foreign policy. This was a policy for the 
continuation of a multinational association, laying more stress on the 
U.N. than on regional alliance. Prime Minister Pearson, insisting that 
there had been no better possibility than collective security at the 
time of the birth of NATO, advocated that a number of middle powers
like Canada should take the initiative to establish a genuine and
95 .
powerful U.N. force.
Canada*s reasoning for remaining in NATO was further shaken 
when the French Government under General de Gaulle refused to accept
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the principle of "flexible response." The French Government announced
56
its complete withdrawal from the military role of NATO in Harch, 1966.
Since one of CanadaTs greatest advantages of being a member of MATO was
"some assurance against eventuality of conflict" between its principal
partners in Europe--Britain and France, it seems that the reason for
97
remaining in MATO had lost its meaning for Canada.
Nevertheless, the Pearson Government upheld its allegiance to 
the alliance as firmly as ever. In response to the French departure 
from MATO, Prine Minister Pearson expressed the following optimistic 
view:
In my judgment . . . (France*s) arguments . . .  do not support 
the conclusion that unified command and planning arrangements 
are no longer necessary for the defence of Uestem Europe . . . .
Providing MATO itself does not disintegrate . . . the imme­
diate military consequences of the French action are thought 
to be manageable . . . . 98
As far as Canada*s bilateral relations with the U.S. through NORAD 
were concerned, the policy of the Pearson Government appeared to be con­
fused. On the one hand, the Government supported the U.S. hard-line 
policy toward the Vietnam Uar and regarded its involvement there as 
"a necessary and justified attempt by the United States to prevent
international Communist aggression and hence, to guard the security of 
99
the free world." On the other, the same government denounced the U.S.
intervention in Vietnam, rationalizing that it had an obligation to be
objective by virtue of its membership in the International Control 
100 
Commission.
In addition to this contradiction, Canada supported, though 
indirectly, the U.S. military actions in Vietnam by way of providing 
munitions to the U.S. The fact that a large number of arms were
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sold by Canada to the U.S. was admitted by the Prime Minister, but he,
at the sane time, refused to DUt an end to it, because where the Canadian
101
arms were destined was beyond Canadian responsibility.
Compared with Canada’s situation, Japan was not a member of ICC. 
The Japanese Government, having supported the American position in the
102
Vietnam Uar, had gained, by 1966, a total of $470 million from the Uar.
The increase of exports directly related to the Uar was not as successful
as the war procurement during the Korean Uar, but the Vietnam Uar
obviously helped to increase Japan’s e::ports to third countries, such as
Korea and Taiwan, of goods for manufacturing items which the U.S. bought 
103
for the Uar.
Leaving a feeling of confusion among the opposition parties, 
the Canadian Government secretly extended the KOPJE) agreement for another 
five years on April 1, 1968. The secret process of renewing the agreement 
was in complete contradiction to the government’s previous acceptance of 
requests by the opposition parties for a full debate on the issue.
Uhen the new Liberal Leader, Pierre Trudeau, took over, it was
expected that he would review Canada’s foreign and defence policies.
During the election campaign in May, 1968, Trudeau stated the necessity
of re-examination of Canada’s alliance. He said:
They (NATO and NOR/D) are an integral part of the delicate 
balance of power on which the peace of the world has rested 
during a long and difficult period. Ue shall take a hard 
look . . .  at our military role in NATO and determine whether 
our military commitment is still appropriate to the present 
situation in Europe. Ue shall look at our role in K0HAD in 
the light of the technological advances of modern weaponry 
and of our fundamental opposition to the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons.104
The Trudeau Government differed from the previous Liberal
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Governments in that neither Trudeau himself nor his Secretary of State 
for External Affairs had the associations or experience with the leader­
ship of the Department of External Affairs. For the first time, the
new Prime Minister ventured to mahe the statement that "the first priority
105
for Canadians is not NATO."
In 1969, RATO was about to celebrate its 20th anniversary.
From that time on, any party in the Treaty could terminate membership
one year after its notice of denunciation. Prime Minister Trudeau
allowed a number of witnesses from the academic community to have the
opportunity to explain their objections to the Pearson-Martin alliance 
106
policy. Extensive hearings were held across Canada for eight weelcs
between January and March, 1969, by the Eouse of Commons Standing
Committee on External Affairs and Rational Defence.
The result did not change much, however. The Government reached
the conclusion that Canada would continue membership in NATO and would
107
co-operate closely with the U.S. within NOEAD and in othe: ways. But 
the Liberal Government under Pierre Trudeau had never submitted the 
renewal of the NORAD agreement to Parliament for approval. It inherited 
that equivocal role of peacekeeping as well as fulfilling its commit­
ment to NATO and NORAD, although the number of the Canadian troops in 
Europe was to be reduced by half.
(2) The Opposition and the Public
■When the North Atlantic alliance was first discussed in the 
late 1940*s, the Liberal Government justified the need for the alliance 
in four points: first, the alliance would reduce Canada*s dependence
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(militarily and politically and economically) on the U.S.; secondly, 
Canada would increase its influence in international affairs through 
the alliance; thirdly, the instability of Europe night endanger North 
.America with the threat of Communism; and finally, regional collecti\re 
security was the best means to protect an unstable Europe (the U.K. 
Security Council was impotent because of the bitter division between 
its permanent members).
These reasons were widely accepted, and Canada’s participation 
in the alliance became a reality. However, in the late 1960’s, it was 
questionable whether these reasons for remaining in NATO were still 
valid. Although the U.K. Security Council and the General Assembly 
are still as ineffective, Canada’s role in NATO has not; become much less 
effective, mainly owing to the recovery of Europe.
Since the North Atlantic Treaty allowed withdrawal within a 
year’s notice of denunciation (after 1969), the question of whether to 
stay in the alliance became the main bone of contention for the opposi­
tion parties. While NATO was diminishing in importance for Canada, the
U.S. was, too, growing less dependent on Canada for its North American 
108
defence. This indicated that Canada could no longer expect to influence 
American foreign policy, since Canada hoped, that its military contribu­
tions to NATO and NORAD would increase its political influence.
Not only the opposition parties, but also many Canadian people
began to doubt if their country could really gain any advantage from
109
its multi-million dollar commitments in NATO and KORAD. The Conservative 
Party, however, failed to propose any specific alternative to the defence
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and foreign policies of the Liberal Government. Nor did it advocate
withdrawal from NOEAD and NATO, promising only to review then in the
110
1968 election campaign.
While the Conservative Party made no significant change in NATO 
and NOEAD, many Canadians came to show an increased interest in the defence 
and foreign policies of their government in the 1960*s, particularly after 
Pierre Trudeau attained Prime Ministership. This tendency of the people 
might have been, to some extent, influenced by the increasing danger of 
new missile interceptors, destroyers and nuclear-equipped missiles.
However, the public was more likely to be concerned, in their 
participation in foreign policy, about human morality, while the oppo­
sition parties were more concerned with the high expense of the Liberal 
Government*s policy. Problems in Vietnam and Nigeria/Biafra, accordingly,
gained higher priority for the Canadian people than the NATO and NORAD 
111
questions. Lack of support from the public made the opposition in Ottawa
less effective in teminating Canada*s participation in NATO and NORAD.
One of today*s most prominent experts in the field of foreign
policy, however, takes a view opposed to increased public interest in
Canada*s defence and foreign problems. He believes that most Canadians
should have no influence in Vietnam, the ABM system or any other foreign
policy problems. International affairs, according to him, should be left
to "the small group of highly educated and broadly experienced men," because
those problems are "too difficult, too complex, and too technical for the 
112
average man."
Although the Canadian public participate to an increasing extent 
in defence and foreign policy problems, it seems the view ex-pressed by
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still the dominant one in Ottawa. That Canada has unusually rich 
resources of information available for a country of its size cannot be 
disputed, but because nore and more Canadian people are becoming 
interested in foreign affairs, it will not be long before the government 
will have to display a greater willingness to improve the channels between 
the government and the people.
(3) Hilitary Co-operation with the U.S.
The following is part of Prime Uinister Pearsonfs letter 
replying to 360 representatives of the University of Toronto*s teaching 
staff in 1967.
The U.S.-Canadian production-sharing arrangements enable the 
Canadian Government to acquire from the U.S.A. a great deal of 
the nation*s essential defence equipment at the lowest possible 
cost, while at the sane tine permitting us to offset the 
resulting drain on the economy by reciprocal sales to the U.S.A. 
Under these agreements, by reason of longer production runs, 
Canadian industry is able to participate competitively in U.S. 
research, development, and production' programmes, and is exempted 
from the "Buy American" Act for these purposes.“ 3
This was also the Prime Hinis ter’s answer to many other
critics who insisted that "weapons going to Vietnam are weapons for
aggression and, unless we can have an assurance that our weapons are
not going to Vietnam, we will not‘sell Anericans any arms."
In the mid-I960*s, the Canadian procurements in the U.S.
increased from $130.1 million in 1965 to $332.6 million in 1966. (Table
15) How Canada spends its money in the U.S. can be derived from the
114
following example. Of the $332.6 Canada spent in 1966:
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Aircraft and components 50%
Navigation and comnuni c at ion equipment 32
Conponents for ammunition 10
Ship components 2*6
Vehicles and conponents 2.4
Research and miscellaneous 3
Almost all these items were for component parts rather than
complete weapons, which are assembled in Canadian factories. The U.S.
buys arms assembled in Canada as well as purely made-in-Canada goods.
Thus, from 1959 to the end of 1969, more than $2.9 billion were sold
to the U.S. "from fill for land mines to jachets for bullets, from
115
complex electronic gear to the Green Berets." lloreover, the factories
producing these goods provide about 100,000 jobs for Canadians.
It is virtually impossible, however, for Canada to produce
anything as large and as complex as a jet interceptor at a competitive 
116
price. The U.S. spent $317.1 million in 1966 on Canadian-made arms and 
other items. They were all items smaller than aircraft. This means that 
Canada, whenever it has to employ modern equipment required fcr KORAD, 
must buy it from the U.S., not being able to produce it at home with 
Canadian labour and brainpower. It seems, therefore, very' unlikely that 
Canadian industry will be exempted from the "Buy American" Act in the 
near future.
Strategically, there has been a great development of the air 
defence system in the 1960*s. First of all, in the Sixties, a new 
warning system against ICBlf*s called the Ballistic Missile Early Warning 
System (BIIEUS) was established in addition to the DEU Line and SAGE.
E1EWS in the ICB11 era did not require Canadian soil for fulfilling its 
purpose. Bases were established in: Thule, Greenland; Clear, Alaska;
and Fylingdalc Moor, England. Furthermore, all EMEUS radar at these
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sites is operated by the nor.-Canadian command, although it is part of 
117 
NORAD.
Secondly, the anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system was introduced
by the Johnson Administration in September, 1967. Since then, the
Canadian Government has refused to agree that the ABM system is at all
relevant to 1I0RAD. Nhen the Ni:;on Administration decided to proceed with
the installation of the ABM system, Frime Minister Trudeau insisted in
March, 1969, that the ABM, as the Pearson Government had said, would not
be a part of KORAD. It was purely an American defence system on which
Canada should not demand any consultation. But he did not deny that
118
Canada night participate in that system at will.
Thirdly, there were tiro other changes proposed for NCR. AD, which
were introduced by U.S. Defence Secretary McNamara in Congress in February,
119
1968, although they as yet remain undecided for Canada. These changes
are, unlike the ABM system, obviously included in NORAD, if decided. One
of chen is the introduction of the F-106 Delta Dart. Once this is
accepted, the old Bonarcs and even the Voodoos in Canada night be
replaced. The other is a new Air-borne Naming and Control System (AUACS).
ANACS is lilcely to replace the DEN Line and even BUEWS. If they are
120
deployed, it is estimated to cost Canada up to $14 billion.
More important than the e:q>ense of modem weapons is the fact 
that the development of the defence system never ceases and continually 
increases in cost. It is very clear that Canada will never be able to . 
deploy the new defence system at the sane pace as the U.S. Therefore, 
the government nay have to alter its traditional view that an increase in 
military commitments in the alliance is justifiable because, it means an
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increase in the sphere of political influence.
The Automatic Extension of the Security Treaty
(1) The Government Policy
Following the stormy period accompanying the revision of the
first Security Treaty» Japan enjoyed enormous economic grotrth throughout
the Sixties. Japan surpassed Britain in GNP by 1967, then France by
1968, and T/est Germany by 1969. Mith a GNP that is expected to reach
$200 billion in 1970, Japan now ranks third in the xrorld, behind the
121
U.S. ($932 billion) and the Soviet Union ($600 billion).
The enormous increase of Japan*s economic power has created, in 
the minds of a majority of Japanese, price in being Japanese. It has 
also caused a great number of Japanese to feel their country has a
vital role to play in sharing more responsibility for world peace, in
122
particular, peace in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific region.
This change of attitude was well illustrated when Japan 
asserted its request for the return of the southern islands (the 
Ogasawara Islands and the Okinawa Islands) from the U.S. Soon after 
his assuming the post of Prime Minister in late 1964, Eisaku Sato 
insisted that, until Okinawa was returned to Japan, the "postwar period" 
would not be over for the Japanese.
In the House of Representatives, on December 5, 1967, the Prime 
Minister announced possible dates for their return, which were arrived 
at in his consultation with President Johnson.
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In ny recent consultation with the President of the U.S., I 
have become certain that we will.reach an agreement on the 
date of reversion (of Okinawa) which is to be within three 
years . . . .
On the other hand, it was agreed that the Ogasawara 
Islands would be returned to Japan within one year . . .  J-53
The reversion of Okinawa, however, has created very complex
problems in relation to the Security Treaty, the escalated Vietnam Uar
and nuclear weapons. The Japanese refused to accept Okinawa with U.S.
124
nuclear bases and weapons. The sensitivity of the Japanese people to
nuclear weapons caused complications for the government, which planned
125
to gain prestige by having Okinawa returned as soon as possible.
On the other hand, Okinawa has been one of the most important
126
U.S. military bases in the Far Eastern and Southeast Asian regions.
Geographically, it is situated right in the center of those regions:
900 miles from Tokyo; 750 miles from Seoul; 400 miles from Taipei;
900 miles from Manila; and 1,750 miles from Saigon.
Previously, the Prime Minister had flatly stated that any
nuclear weapons on the Ogasawara Islands had to be removed before they
were returned. He stood firmly on his famous "three basic principles on
127
non-nuclear proliferation.” As a result, the Ogasawara Islands have been
returned to Japan devoid of nuclear weapons.
Because of the importance of the bases there, Prime Minister Sato
did not immediately clarify whether the conditions applied to the
Ogasawara Islands would be applied to Okinawa, too, at the time of the
reversion. In April, 1968, he refused to go into further discussion on
the question of Okinawa, other than saying that the conditions concerning
12G
the U.S. bases in Okinawa were still in the stage of "blank paper." 
According to him, Japan should first concentrate on having Okinawa and
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its one million people returned to Japan, before demanding further
conditions regarding the military bases there. The Prime Minister*s
purpose was to strengthen Jaoan*s ties with the U.S., instead of
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arousing resentment and susp/icion. This was clearly expressed in the 
communique after he consulted with President Nixon in late llovember, 1969.
During the consultation, the Prime Minister was successful in 
having the U.S. agree to withdraw its nuclear weapons from the strate­
gic island before its reversion to Japan in 1972. However, he consented
to the U.S. deploying nuclear weapons on Okinawa "in an emergency after
130
close consultation with the Japanese Government." He also agreed on the 
expansion of Japanese defence forces in proportion to its national power.
The Sato Government dissolved the House of Representatives a 
month after the announcement of the communique. The Liberal Democratic 
Government returned with a decrease in the popular vote, but with more 
seats. In June, 1970 the Security Treaty between the U.S. and Japan was, 
according to the previous announcement, automatica11y extended without 
any complications.
(2) The Opposition and the Public
Since 1964, the nuclear power of China has been slowly but 
steadily developing. On the Korean peninsula, the confrontation 
between North and South Korea at the 38th parallel has been intensified 
by the North Korean attempt to assassinate the President of -South Korea 
in January, 1968. Immediately following that, the American Navy intel­
ligence ship, the Pueblo, was captured by the North Korean guard on the
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Sea of Japan. In Vietnam* the U.S. transferred its main B-52 base from 
Guam Island to Okinawa, in order to shorten the bombing run and to 
counteract a heavy attack by the national Liberation Front.
Under these circumstances, in the late 1960*s a large number 
of the Japanese people feared possible involvement in war since Japan 
served as an offensive military base of the U.S. According to the
opposition, the possibility of involvement in war was because of Satofs
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renewal of the Security Treaty with the U.S. The opposition further 
denounced the government*s failure to adhere to the "previous consulta­
tion" clause which was interpreted to require "consent" of the Japanese 
Government. J^hen the U.S. nuclear submarines visited Japanese ports 
in 1968, the government took a very indecisive attitude towards them. 
The lack of firmness with the U.S. in the negotiations on the Okinawa 
reversion policy also made the opposition attack the government for 
Japan*s possible involvement in war.
However, unlike 1960, the opposition parties proposed their own 
policies on the Security Treaty and the reversion of Okinawa. Although 
there were some minority opinions within the opposition parties, their
policies towards these two main issues of the late Sixties can be
132
classified as follows:
I. The Security Treaty
The Japan Socialist Party:
Denunciation of the Treaty through diplomatic procedure; 
the withdrawal of the U.S. troops and bases; the gradual 
dissolution of Japanfs Self-Defence Forces and reforming 
into a National Police; the establishment of a peace 
treaty with the Soviet Union and the restoration of 
relationships with China.
The Democratic Socialist Party:
Continuation of the Treaty, but with no U.S. troops in
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Japan, except in an emergency; the' retention of a minimum 
of Self-Defence Forces, upon public consensus; then, a real 
security dependent upon Japan*s independent foreign policy.
The Fair Play Party:
Gradual annulment of the Treaty through refusing the increase 
of armed forces and U.S. bases, and adhering to stricter 
"previous consultation"; the establishment of a perfect neutral 
foreign policy; and the maintenance of Japan*s national Guard 
reduced from the Self-Defence Forces.
The Japan Communist Party:
Exparte denunciation of the Treaty; the proclamation of 
Japan*s neutral policy, which denies any foreign troops in 
Japan; immediate dissolution of the Self-Defence Forces; 
then, the conclusion of a real international peace treaty 
through which Japan would be protected from all external 
enemies.
II. The Question of Okinawa
The Japan Socialist Party:
Immediate complete reversion with no U.S. military bases 
and troops.
The Democratic Socialist Party:
Complete reversion without nuclear bases but with other 
bases, which are on similar conditions to those of the 
fatherland.
The Fair Play Party:
Immediate complete reversion and immediate withdrawal of 
the U.S. bases; some inevitable bases, if any, should be 
withdrawn in five years.
The Japan Communist Party:
Immediate complete reversion with no conditions; immediate 
complete withdrawal of the U.S. bases.
There were public polls on the Security Treaty, the Self-
Defence Forces, and the question of Okinawa, taken by two nation-wide
newspapers, Yoniuri Shinbun and Hainichi Shimbun, between April and
June, 1968. How much public opinion is represented by the government
or the opposition parties is indicated in their results.
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Yoniuri Shinbun (April 7 - 9 ,  1968)
1. Question: Japan has concluded the Security Treaty with the
U.S. Do you think the Treaty is useful for Japan’s 
security?
Answer: Very useful 127.
Somewhat useful 43
Useless 17
Can’t say 10
Others 1
Don * t know 16
No answer 1
2. Question: The year 1970 is the tine vhen this Treaty is to 
be re-exanined. At that tine, which of the 
following do you think is the most desirable?
Answer: Solidification of the Treaty for
a longer tern 6.8%
Automatic extension 11.6
Revision to weaken it 36.1
Denunciation 10.8
Others 7.5
Don * t know 25.2
No answer 2.0
3. Question! Do you think the U.S. military bases in Okinawa 
are useful for Japan’s security?
Answer: Very useful 5%
Somewhat useful 24
Useless 45
Can’t say 12
Others 1
Don*t know and 
no answer 13
4. Question: Uhen Okinawa is returned to Japan, do you think
the U.S. nuclear bases should remain, or should 
they be taken away beforehand, or are they 
inevitable?
Answer: Should remain 3%
Should not remain 66
Inevitable 20
Can’t say 4
Others 1
Don’t know and no answer 6
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5. Question: The Sato Government has a policy that Japan nust
neither produce nuclear weapons, nor possess then, 
nor acquire their, from abroad. Do you approve or
disapprove of this policy?
Answer: Approve 78%
Disapprove 8
Canft say 7
Others 1
Donrt know and no answer 1
tlainichi Shinbun (June 14 - 15, 1968)
1. Question: Do you think it is necessary for Japan to have
the Self-Defence Forces?
Answer: Necessary 827.
Unnecessary 15
Others 3
(for those who answered it was necessary)
Question: Why is it necessary?
Answer: To use against aggressive enemies 17%
For the maintenance of public peace 31
For disaster relief 27
Because most countries have their 
own armed forces 6
Others 1
(for those who answered it was unnecessary)
Question: Why is it unnecessary?
Answer: Unconstitutional 5%
Useless for defence 2
No danger of aggression 1
Japan should automatically surrender 3
Waste of taxes 4
Othe rs 0
2. Question: At present the total number of the Self-Defence
Forces (Ground, Maritime and Air) is about 250,000. 
Do you think it should be increased or reduced?
Answer: Increased 17%
Left intact 62
Reduced 8
Abolished 8
Others and no answer 5
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In addition to this, I In ini chi Sh inbun took three polls in 
Okinawa on how the U.S. bases should be changed when the Okinawans 
come under Japanese rule. None of these polls were taken before the 
Sato-Nixon consultaion, in which the specific date of returning Okinawa 
to Japan was set. nevertheless, the results of the polls show their 
uncertainty about the status of the U.S. bases, intermingled with their 
desire to become Japanese citizens.
Public Opinion Poll Results on Status of the U.S. Bases in Okinawa
A B C
Same as Fatherland 117, 27% 21%
Complete vJithdrawal 25 18 14
Free Use without
Nuclear Ueapons 24 43 26
Free Use with
Nuclear Ueapons 12 5 7
Others and No Answer 28 7 32
(Hote: A=Decenber 1-5, 1967; B=?ebruary 26-lIarch 3, I960;
C^September 7-11, 1968)
According to these public opinion polls, the majority of the 
Japanese people preferred gradual weakening of its military alliance 
with the U.S., xjhile, at the same time, approved the present Self-Defence 
Forces. Although a large number of the people were uncertain or were 
inconclusive about the Security Treaty in the year 1970, most of them 
approved of the non-nuclear policy of the Sato Government. Therefore, 
in view of public sentiment, it is understandable that the Government 
pursued a policy of automatic extension of the Security Treaty in June, 
1970, after having set the specific date of the reversion of Okinawa 
without U.S. nuclear bases.
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(3) Military Co-operation with the U.S.
While in Canada the defence industries buy components from 
the U.S. and are restricted from making anything as large as a jet 
plane, the Japanese defence industries produce most of their modem 
airplanes at home. By the second Defence Production Plan (1965-67) 
defence items, including F-104 J fighters, were to be manufactured at
home. As a result, the Japanese industries succeeded in manufacturing
133
64 per cent of the thirty F-104 Js.
The third Defence Supplies and Equipment Programme which was
set up in November, 1966, with the $6,500 million estimated cost, included
the Nike Hercules, the Hawk, light and heavy tanks, large- and middle-
134
size helicopters, and others to be manufactured at home. The total cost
of home-manufactured defence products came to $1,388.9 million. Only
34*4 per cent of the estimated cost of $6,500 million in the Programme
was to be spent on defence weapons, of which more than 60 per cent was
135
to go to,Japan’s defence industries.
Consequently, Japan's defence industries have been rapidly 
growing. However, as in the Canadian case, Japan's research on military 
development is negligible compared with that of the U.S. This means the 
"home-manufacturing" policy encourages closer link-ups between the 
military industrial complexes rather than reducing Japan's dependence 
on the U.S.
The closer link-ups between the two military-industrial complexes
are, moreover, supported by governmental bilateral agreements, for
example, the "Memorandum on Military Research and Development" in 1968
136
and "U.S.-Japan Aerospace Co-operation Agreement" in 1969. The latter was 
said to pave "the way for American aerospace industry assistance in the
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Seventies in the development of Japanese IGBM-type rockets" which could
137
be armed with nuclear warheads rather than space research satellites.
In fact, most of the top Japanese defence contractors are closely tied 
to the top 100 American defence industries by licensing agreements and 
joint ventures.
In strategy, on the other hand, U.S.-Japan military co-operation
has entered a new era. It is a known fact that since 1965 at least,
Japan's Maritime and Air Self-Defence Forces have been conducting joint
maneuvers with South Korean, Nationalist Chinese, and the U.S. Seventh 
138
Fleet forces. Its joint maneuvers with the U.S. Navy (mainly the Seventh
Fleet) began as early as 1959* The period of exercise has been extended
139
from 5 days in 1959 to 11 days in 1968.
Every year since 1962, the Ground Self-Defence Force has been
sending its missile operators to the McGregor missile-test field in New 
140
Mexico. In addition to this, GSDF sends 150 to 200 of its best soldiers
to the U.S. to study the technology of new weapons.
In spite of this, the Self-Defence Forces of Japan have steadily
become more independent from the U.S. in their system of command. It is not
only because of the decrease in the number of U.S. troops in Japan, but
also because the quantity as well as quality of the Forces have become
close to par with those of the U.S. forces in Japan, after the completion
of the third Defence Programme.
ASDF, the force most integrated with the U.S., no longer conducts
japanese-American joint exercises in as large a scale and as long a period
141
as it had been doing. Furthermore, the Matsumae-Bums Agreement, in which 
Japan and the U.S. held their own command separately, unlike NORAD and 
NATO, has lapsed. In fact, the U.S. bomber squadrons were removed from
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Japan in June, 1S66. Since then, Japan has been guarded only by A3D7, 
and a new Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) system installed 
in April, 1968.
Japanese military co-operation with the U.S. has indeed moved 
in the direction of depending less on the U.S. for command, while, at 
the same time, becoming increasingly characterized by economic inter­
relations. This is significantly different from the situation of Canada 
which has become gradually dependent on the U.S. both military operation 
and defence production.
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TABLE 1 5 .
Procurements Under Canada-U.S._Defence Sharing Programme
(195'9~-~1967)
in nil!.ions of Canadian dollars
Year Canadian Procurement in U.S. U.S. Procurement in Canada
1959 45.3 96.3
1960 51.7 112.7
1961 37.7 142.6
1962 127.4 254.3
1963 152.0 142.0
1964 173.3 166.S
1965 130.1 259.5
1966 332.6 317.1
1967 293.8 307.7
Source; Canada* Department of Defence Production, Annual Report, 
1960-68, The Queen*s Printer, Ottawa.
TABLE 16.
Total Budgetary 5:n?enditures and Ililitary E;ipenditures
(1964 - 1968)
in millions of U.S. dollars
Canada Jan an
Year Total(A) Hilitary(B) B/A Total(A) Hilitary(B) B/A
1964 6, 422 1,610 25% 9,197 764 8%
1965 6,695 1, 482 22 10,347 954 9
1966 7,178 1,492 21 11,831 946 8
1967 8,168 1,583 19 14,454 1,058 7
1968 9,179 1,641 18 16,163 1,172 3
Note; B includes eizpenses of National Defence, Defence Production 
(or Defence Establishment) and Industry. All figures are 
calculated on the base of the U.S. dollar which is equivalent 
to Canadian $1.07 and Japanese ¥360 regardless of fluctua­
tion.
Source; Canada, Department of Finance, Budget Speech, 1965-69,
The Queen'*s Printer, Ottawa; Japan, Prime llinister*s Office, 
Nihon Tokei Nentkan, 1969, Tokyo.
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TABLE 17.
Military Strength, 1964 - 1958
Canada Japan
Year Total CRN CRA CRAF Total HSDF GSDF ASDF
1964 120,000 20,700 49,000 50,600 244,000 35,000 171,500 39,000
1965 120,000 20,700 49,000 50,600 246,COO 35,000 172,000 39,000
1966 107,000 18,000 44,000 45,000 246,000 35,000 171,500 39,500
1967 103,000 17,000 42,000 44,000 246,000 35,000 171,500 39,500
196S 101,600 16,600 41,500 43,500 250,000 36,000 174,000 40,000
Source: The Institute for Strategic Studies, Military Balance, 1964-69.
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Since the end of h'oriel liar II, both Canada and Japan have 
maintained a close military co-operation with the IT.S. In the first 
stage, as examined in the previous chapter, the two countries were 
situated in completely different international environments. Canada in 
the late Forties and in the early,Fifties was the strongest nation among 
middle powers. Abundant in natural resources and land area, it had an 
industrial capacity ranb.ed as one of the highest in the world after the 
collapse of the economies of the west European countries follow-ing the
T-Tn  „* * -ti •
In spite of this, its strong economic power did not effect 
military independence from, the U.S. This contrasts with the Japanese 
trend towards reducing military dependence on the U.S., after the re­
establishment of its economic power in the early Sixties. By that time, 
antagonism, between the U.S. and the Soviet Union had escalated the develop­
ment of offensive weapons.
In the ICBII era--the late Fifties and early Sixties--Canadals 
geographical remoteness from enemies of conventional war became much less 
important for Canada’s security. The problems of continental defence were 
characterised by a completely new and unprecedented urgency. Up to the 
time of the Cuban crisis, the military integration between Canada and 
the U.S. had been taking place rapidly.
In the Fifties, when Canada was busy in international affairs, it 
was also occupied with establishing a continental defence system with the 
U.S. Japan had just become independent at the beginning of the decade 
and was seeking admission to the United Nations. Almost completely 
protected by the U.S., Japan was militarily a small power with one-fifth
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to one quarter of Canada’s military expenditures throughout the Fifties.
In spite of Japan’s proximity to the eastern border of the Soviet Union> 
Japan’s small economic and military poirer hardly provided the Soviet 
Union sufficient provocation for attach.
Canada has been gradually losing its strategic significance in 
continental defence. In the nid Sixties* with the development and construc­
tion of the Ballistic Hissile Early Taming System (BUSTS), Canada’s role 
vis-2t-vis the U.S. declined in importance. Since then, Canada’s contribu­
tions to continental defence have grown even less important than the 
contributions it made to NATO and EOP.AD in the Fifties and in the early 
Sixties.
In contrast to Canada’s diminishing strategic significance,
Japan, in the Sixties, was gradually moving away from dependence on the 
U.5.--economically, politically, and militarily. Thile Japan’s '’perpetual” 
conservative governments have maintained a pro-Anerican policy, Japanese 
military power has been rapidly re-established with the accompanying 
diminution of dependence on the U.S.
Politically, the U.S. needs a Japan sufficiently strong to
defend itself because it serves as a "bastion" of American democracy
in Asia and also to deter potential enemies on the west and the north.
Contrary to this, Canada is no longer essential to the U.S. in the
1CB11 era, unless the U.S. decides'that it must meet the threat of
missile attach by means of the anti-ballistic missile (ABIl) system
1
installed on Canadian soil.
Throughout the postwar period, Canada’s military co-operation 
with the U.S. has been very close. In particular, since the exchange of
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the KOEAD agreements in 1953, Canada has become integrated for military 
purposes with the U.S. to a degree higher than ever before. At present, 
Canada’s military power compared with that of the U.S. is so small that 
it may not be significant to the U.S. for continental defence.
Uhile the Trudeau Government has decided to reduce Canada’s 
military contributions to NATO and promises to take a hard look at the 
alliance of NOEAD with an eye to decreasing its commitments, the Sato 
Government anticipates an increase in Japan’s military forces in propor­
tion to its economic power. In light of this, Canada and Japan have reached 
turning points in their military relations with the U.S. As shown in the 
gradual decrease of its military expenditures in percentage of total 
expenditures, Canada’s military contributions both to KOEAD and NATO 
might be further reduced. Japan, on the other hand, will continue to 
increase its military expenditures in proportion to its rise of GUP, 
but whether this means it will expand its military responsibilities over 
the Southeast Asian and the western Pacific regions remains unclarified.
These trends in military relations with the U.S. between. Canada 
and Japan can be related to geographical, socio-cultural and economic 
divergences. Moreover, the trends may also be related to cone character­
istics of the Canadian and Japanese political systems.
Geographical factors of the two countries have influenced the 
postwar trends of military relations with the U.S. to a high degree.
Because of its geographical location, Canada has become more closely 
related in strategy to the U.S. than to any other NATO member under the 
Canada-U.S. Segional Group of arrangements for air defence of North
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America. As partner to such a giar.t military power, Canada has hardly 
any chance to influence the U.S. armed forces in its collective security 
with the U.5.
In the late Fifties and in the early Si::ties, Canada’s close co­
operation with the U.3* based on geographical location, became more apparent, 
fince the Itussian introduction of the Inter-continental ballistic Ilissiie 
(ICBII) in 1957, there has been a growing arms race between the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. The increasing threat of the Soviet Union over the 
Forth hole by the ICBII strengthened Canada’s military co-operation with 
the U.S.
In addition to the DBF Line along the coast of the Arctic Ocean, 
there are the Hid-Canada Line across Canada at the 50th parallel, the 
Line Tree Line on the U.S.-Canadian border, and the Semi-Automatic Ground 
Environment (3AGE) system--all are designed to defend Forth America 
against the Soviet long-range bombers and missile attach over the Forth 
hole. Canada is geographically situated first in the line of Soviet attach. 
Yet an Soviet missile technology improves, the warning time these systems 
provide the U.S. declines.
In  th e  m id and la t e  S i: : t ie s ,  d e s p ite  th e  f a c t  th a t  a l l - o u t  n u c le a r
w ar has become le s s  l i k e l y ,  Canada’ s g e o g ra p h ic a l lo c a t io n  has been la r g e ly
responsible for continuing close relations with the U.S. By cutting down
on personnel e:q'.enses» the Canadian Government could afford to modernise
2
the FOItAD equipment. However, Canada’s military establishment has lost 
the strategic significance it once possessed. Owing to geographical 
location, the remaining significance of Canada to the U.S. is that it 
provides an early warning system and that it allows the Americans free
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.access to Canada in time of emergency. Even this significance may
become greatly reduced, once the recently launched spy satellite,
which makes it possible for the U.S. Air Force to observe long-range
missile launching sites in China and the Soviet Union, comes into 
3
operation.
As for Japan, in the late Forties and early Fifties, it was 
only a part of the "Asian bastion" against Soviet Communism, which had 
already encroached on the Asian continent. When the Chinese Communists 
established the Peking Government in October, 1949» the military 
protective front of "American democracy" was fortified along the crescent­
shaped line of Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines.
In the Korean War, the Peking Government explicitly expressed its 
opposition to the U.S. and its allies. The fortification of the U.S. 
military front in Asia, including Japan, was further strengthened.
In the late Fifties and early Sixties, however, Japan's geographical 
remoteness from North America created a doubt among some Japanese about 
whether the U.S. would seriously come to protect their country. Japan's 
rapidly growing economic power gradually drew attention from the Peking 
and Moscow Governments. With two potential enemies only across the Sea 
of Japan, the Japanese political leaders busily devoted themselves to 
acquiring a military power, at least capable of self-defence.
Ever since China's first nuclear bomb testing in 19&4» nuclear 
bomb experiments have been occurring every year there. Faced with the 
possibility of the Chinese Communists producing a long-range ballistic 
missile system, the Japanese budgetary expenditures on armed forces
4
suddenly doubled in 1965 the rate of increase of the previous year.
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To oppose a long-range ballistic nissile attack, Japan built 
the Base Air Defence Ground Environment (BADGE) system in 1968. In the 
case of bomber attack, Japan nay non be able to defend itself for a 
limited length of tine. In this field, the Self-Defence Forces operate 
almost completely independently from the U.S. command. Examination of 
this trend of Japan’s military relations with the U.S. also shows that 
geographical factors have been, to a considerable degree, responsible for 
the resulting independent operation of Japan’s armed forces.
Socio-cultural factors may also explain differences in the postwar
trends of military co-operation with the U.S. between Canada and Japan.
In Canada’s case, the U.S. has always posed a potential threat to Canada.
Then Canada eagerly fostered the idea of establishing a Forth Atlantic
community, which brought the U.S. into the west European sphere, its
main motive was to ease its heavy dependence on the U.S. and to create
"a more healthy balance" within the community. Canada sought to escape
from a renewed threat of an unacceptable degree of control by the U.S.,
immediately after the Uar. This seems to be one of the reasons'which
caused the External Affairs llinister at that tine, Lester Fearson, to say:
An Atlantic union must have a deeper meaning and deeper roots.
It must create conditions for a kind of co-operation which 
goes beyond the immediate emergency.-*
The French Canadians have developed a "state-of-siege mentality" 
for a long period of their history. They have continuously felt domina­
tion either by the English-speaking Canadians or Americans. Since the 
postwar period the English-speaking Canadians, .too, have developed a 
feeling that they are being threatened from the south. The fact that,
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presently, both French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians share
a similar sentiment may serve to encourage reduction of Canada’s heavy
dependence on the U.C. L'oreover, in the Seventies, the growing role
of French Canadians in the government nay also lead Canada to closer
relations with French-streaking countries, not only in Europe, but
also in Africa* Asia and the Caribbean, because of the desire to weaken
its heavy cultural* economic, military and rolitical dependence on the 
6
U.S.
Historically, Japan was considered as a potential enemy of the 
U.S. After it e::panded its sphere of economic, political and military 
influence in Asia, Japan embarked on a campaign of destruction precipi­
tating Uorle Uar II. Although Japan has rebuilt a close friendship with 
the.U.S. and its allies after the bar* the U.S. as well as other Asian 
neighbours have been careful to watch for any sign of a militarist 
revival in Japan.
with the increased economic power, the possibilit2? of Japan’s 
becoming once again a military giant has also increased. Uhile Canada 
is threatened by "familiarity” with the U.S., the U.S. may feel 
threatened by a Japan militarily independent cf the U.S. and growing in 
strength.
From the beginning of the military co-operation with the U.S. 
in the postwar period, the Canadian majority expressed their support for 
it, while a large number of the Japanese people were confused by or 
opposed to their military alliance with the U.S. In Japan, cultural and 
linguistical differences between the U.S. and Japan has been one of the
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greatest barriers to pronoting or even maintaining a close military 
relationship with the U.5.
On the other hand, in spite of (or perhaps, because of) the socio­
cultural convergence, the U.S. has posed a threat for Canada culturally 
as veil as politically, militarily and economically. The barrier, in this 
case, is caused by fear of losing the Canadian identity, and, perhaps in
the long run, Canadian sovereignty and independence, nevertheless, the
7
Canadians, as a rule, maintain a trust in the U.S., and the U.S. is 
Canada’s closest friend and ally and mill remain so.
In the late Si:;ties, the Japanese people continued to display a
distrust of American bases and troops in Japan. Generally, the majority
of the people do not believe that, in spite of the existence of the
Security Treaty between the two, the U.S. mould protect Japan in case 
8
of emergency. This lach of confidence seems to have some relation to the
great differences in culture between the U.S. and Japan. One Gallup
International survey re accomplishments in the Sixties provides evidence
contrasting Canadian admiration of the U.S. with Japanese self- 
9 .
admiration.
Question: Uhich countin' in the world can looh bach on the years
1960 to 1969 with the most satisfaction for what it has 
achieved?
Answer: . Canada Japan
Own country 25% 35%
U.S.A. • 35 20
West Germany 5 10
U.3.S.R. - 3
China - 4
Others 16 2
Can’t say 19 26
Economic factors also figure significantly in the postwar trends 
of the military co-operation with the U.3. Throughout the postwar period
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Canada's econorrry has, without a doubt, been heavily dependent upon the
U.S. Canada's trade with the U.S. has accounted for sixty per cent of
its exports and seventy per cent of its imports. For the U.S., too, 
Canada has been the leading trading partner. The high figure of U.S. 
investments in Canada has long controlled a large part of the Canadian 
economy.
The Japanese economy, similarly, has been heavily dependent on 
the U.S., but much less so compared with that of Canada. In the Fifties 
and in the Sixties, less than 30 per cent of Japan's total foreign trade 
was with the U.S. Taking into consideration that Canada's foreign trade 
occupies one-third of its GNP compared to one-fifth in Japan, it appears 
much more important for Canada to maintain close economic relations with 
the U.S. than for Japan. As economic prosperity is for both Canada and 
Japan a most important national interest, a change in their military 
relations with thw U.S. must not cause a reduction of economic co­
operation—  and this is much more true for Canada.
In addition to these factors of geography, socio-culture and 
economy, the differences of political systems between Canada and Japan, 
as already mentioned, may also bear relation to the postwar trends of 
their military co-operation with the U.S. Absence of any noticeable 
academic clique among Canadian senior officials and a higher level of 
educational background may make for a higher degree of variety in Canada' 
policy outputs compared to Japan. The tendency towards variety of policy 
outputs is also produced in Canada by the convergence of the two major 
parties, the Progressive Conservatives and the Liberals, which share 
the same basic principles on foreign and defence policies, thus 
permitting the exploration of various means to implement these principles
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In such cases as NATO, NORAD, and the U.N. Peacekeeping force, decisions 
on Canada’s foreign and defence policies have basically been shared by 
the two major parties. Both parties also agree on reducing military 
expenditures.
Compared with the Canadian case, the existence of an academic 
clique and a large number of career men in the Japanese bureaucracy 
provides a hindrance to the working of foreign and defence policies.
Another obstacle to more flexible and broader policy outputs is, in Japan, 
the uncompromising difference between the conservative government and the 
opposition. Because of their lack of co-operation in policy-making, policy 
outputs are very limited in comparison to those of Canada.
While the Canadian opposition has wide representation in the 
bureaucracy, the bureaucracy of Japan contains hardly any members of the 
opposition. Furthermore, mainly because of structural and functional 
characteristics of Japan’s Foreign Affairs Ministry, defence policy-making 
is much more restricted among the bureaucrats of the National Defence 
Agency. In Canada, the Department of External Affairs and National 
Defence co-operate with each other, as far as foreign and defence 
policy-making is concerned. The Japanese bureaucrats in the Defence 
Agency, on the other hand, suffer the disadvantage of isolation from 
the Foreign Affairs Ministry. This has some effect on the degree of 
flexibility and tolerance in their policy-making.
The Japanese military policies which support promotion of 
increased independence from the U.S. by expanding national armed forces 
may be near-sighted in terms of the dangerous developments in the Thirties 
and the Forties. On the other hand, Canada’s wide variety of policy
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.outputs may result in finding a means of escaping from an unacceptable 
degree of military integration with the U.S., without significantly 
increasing the cost of defence, such as Canada's support of the U.N. 
Peace-keeping forces.
< Most important of all these factors is the geographical and 
socio-cultural divergence between Canada and Japan. Thid divergence 
may indicate a possible direction of the two countries' military co­
operation with the U.S., at least in the near future. On the one hand, 
Canada's heavy dependence on the U.S. will probably continue with little 
chance of reviving its strategic significance. Japan, on the other 
hand, is likely to continue to become more independent from the U.S., 
militarily, economically and politically. Its rapid increase of military 
expenditures and armed forces seems to suggest that it may expand its 
military commitments over the western Pacific and Southeast Asian regions. 
However, it is still too early to say that this will become a firm govern­
mental policy in the near future.
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3. The sizes of Quebec, Newfoundland and Japan are 523,860 sq. 
miles, 143,045 sq. miles and 142,775 sq. miles respectively.
4. In 1967, an average of 5.3 Canadians occupied each square mile, 
while an average of 701.9 Japanese lived in the same area.
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way of life was not being overly influenced by the U.S.
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pp. 43-55.
The poll taken in September, 1950 showed the following result.
Should Japan be pro-American, pro-Soviet, or neutralist?
Pro-American 557,
Pro-Soviet 0
Neutralist 22
Others and don*t 
know 23
Question:
Answer:
25. Ibid., pp. 102-21.
The poll on the same date showed this result:
Question: Do you approve or disapprove the presence of U.S. base:
in Japan?
Answer: Approve 307
Disapprove 38
Others and don*t know 32
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26. llildred A. Schwartz, _co. cit., p. 67.
Sixty-eight per cent thought it was good for Canada that so nuch develop­
ment had been financed by U.S. money. (The poll was taken on July 13> 1956.)
27. Ibid., p. 66 and p. 70.
28. Douglas Hendel* Jr., ao. cit., pp. 102-21.
Question: Uhy do you approve (or oppose) the presence of American
bases in Japan?
Answer: Approve because February 1953 February'
Self-defence inadequate 21% 4%
Fear Communist invasion 5 3
Others or no reason 7 1
33 8
Oppose because
Offence to national pride 11 20
Self-defence adequate 7 14
Hay involve us in war 4 9
Hams national morals 5 4
Economic costs 8 -
Others or no reason 7 11
42 58
Ho opinion on bases 25 " 34
29. Ibid., pp. 68-74.
Question: Do you approve or oppose the idea that Japan needs milita:
forces?
Answer: Hay 1954 August 1957
Approve 52% 647.
Oppose 30 19
Others or don’t know 18 17
Question: Do you approve or oppose Japan’s rearmament?
Answer: January' 1953 August 1957
Approve 50% 31%
Oppose . 20 42
Others or don’t know 30 27
30. Ibid., pp. 68-74.
This poll was taken in- August, 1957.
Question: Ifnat is the best way to protect Japan’s security?
Answer: Our own forces 37%
Collective security 27
American forces 4
Others or don’t know 32
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31. Peyton Lyon* Canada in Uorld Affairs* 1961-63* Oxford University 
Press, Toronto (I960), Appendix B.
September 1961
Question: TJhich country do you think is further ahead in the field
of long-range missiles and rockets--the U.S.A. or Russia?
Answer: U.S.A. 21.2%
Psussia 50.9
About the sane 15.5
Don*t know 12.A
November 1961
Questi.on: The Russian radio often claims that Russia wants to end
the Cold h'ar and seek only peace. Do you feel that this 
is sincere, or do you think this is only propaganda?
Answer: Sincere 14.0%
Propaganda 73.4
Qualified (write in) 2.8
Don’t know 9.9
Question: Should war come, do you think it is more likely to arise
through the U.S.A., Russia or some other way?
Answer: Both U.S.A. and Russia 25.3%
U.S. ii. 3.5
Russia 33.3
China (volunteered) 5.5
Other way 12.9
Don’t know 18.3
32. R.B. Byers, Canadian Foreign Policy and Selected Attentive 
Publics, Prepared for the Department of External Affairs, (Unpublished), 
December 1967.
Question: Some people think that the best way to prevent war is for
the Uest to increase its military strength so as to be more 
powerful than the Russians. Others think that this would
lead us to an armed race which may cause a war. That do 
you think? Should the Uest try to increase its military' 
strength or not?
Answer: Yes, should increase 58%
No, should not increase 32
Others or don’t know 10
(This poll was taken in November, 1962.)
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33* Peyton Lyon, og. cit., Appendix B.
September 1961
Question: Some people say that Canada is becoming more and more 
dependent on the U.S. for our air defence. Do you, or 
do you not think that this is happening?
Answer: Yes, it is happening 66.1$
No, it is not happening 19*4
Can’t say 14.2
Question: If Canada’s defence becomes merged more and more
with that of the U.S., would you approve or disapprove?
Answer: Approve 68.2$
Disapprove 21.7
No opinion 10.1
34. The Gallup Report, The Gallup Poll of Canada, The Canadian Insti­
tute of Public Opinion, April 11, 1964*
Question: Canada’s defence policies are being argued about a good 
deal. Which of these statements comes closest to what 
you think Canada should do?
Answer: The U.S. should take responsibility for
defending Canada 3$
Canada should maintain her own defence 17
Defence should be a joint effort between 
Canada and the U.S. 67
Canada should disarm and become a neutral nation 11
Can't say 2
35* Tokyo Shimbun. July 19, 1959*
Question: Do you think that the new treaty will involve Japan in 
war or make Japan more secure?
Answer: Will involve Japan in war 44*5$
Will guarantee Japan's security 21.5
Don't know 34»0
Central Research Company (for the Prime Minister’s Office), October 9, 1959*
Question: Are you in favour of or opposed to Japan's general co­
operation with the U.S. in the future?
Answer: In favour 53$
Opposed 17
Uncertain 30
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36. Central Research Company? December 1965.
Question: Are you reassured or worried about Japan’s security in
the future?
Answer: Reassured 22.1%
Uorried 49.3
Don’t know 29.1
Question: Do you, or do you not think that, as civilisation progresses,
the possibility of war decreases?
Answer: Yes, decreases 14.5%
No, does not decrease 59.7 
Don’t know- 25.8
37. Ibid.
Question: \Je now belong to the "free world" bloc. Do you think
that we should continue to be part of the "free world" 
bloc, change to the Communist bloc, or be neutral?
Answer: The "free world" bloc 50.0%
The Communist bloc 0.9
Neutral 25.4
Don’t know 23.8
38. Ibid.
Question: If conditions cail for it, do you think that we should
be involved in war?
Answer: Should not be in war 75.8%
Depends upon the conditions 12.6
Don * t know 11.6
39. Ibid.
Question: Do you approve or oppose the Self-Defence Forces?
Answer: Approve 81.9%
Oppose 4.9
Don’t .know 13*2
40. R.B. Byers, op. cit., June 1967, pp. 85 and 95.
Question: At the present time Canadian foreign policy places
considerable emphasis on the peacekeeping role. Do 
you feel that this emphasis is—
Answer: Not enough 26.6%
About enough 54.4
Too much 15.2
Undecided 2.5
No answer 1*3
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Question: If Canada only had the military and financial capability
to support one of the following foreign policy activities 
—  NATO, HOP AD, or peacekeeping— which would you consider 
most important?
An swe r: P e a c eke ep i ng 53.2%
NATO 26.5
NOPAD 15.2
No answer 5.1
-ibid., June 1967, p. 96.
Question: Should Canada pursue a more independent foreign policy?
Answer: Yes 63.3%
No 20.2
Undecided 7.6
No answer 8.9
42* Ibid., June 1967, pp. 96 and 33.
Question: In your opinion should Canada renew the NORAD agreement
with the United States in 1968?
An swe r: Yes 63.3%
No 21.5
Undecided 12.7
No answer 2.5
Question: Presuming NATO continues after 1969 should Canada remain
a member of the alliance?
Answer: Yes 75.9%
No 13.9
Undecided 9.9
No answer 1.3
43. The Gallup Report, Harch 28, 1970.
Question: Do you think Canada is becoming more dependent on the
U.S., or less dependent, than it was, say, ten years ago?
National Quebec Ontario Uest
More dependent 50% 42% 57% 54%
Less dependent 22 22 20 20
No difference 18 15 15 19
Can*t say 10 19 8 7
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Ibid., January 24, 1970.
Question: Looking ahead ten years, which country do you think will
have the most to offer ordinary people for their happiness?
/in ewer: Canada 54%
U.S.A. 14
Others 8
Canft say 24
45. Yoniuri Shimbun Sha, Kirokut Kokkai Anpo Ronso, Tokyo (1968), 
vol. 2, p. 204.
April 7-9, 1968
Question: They continue to produce nuclear weapons in Communist
China. Do you, or do you not feel threatened by it?
Answer: Yes, strongly 35%
Yes, somewhat 37
No, not at all 17
Can*t say 4
Others or don*t know 6
No answer 1
46. Ibid., p. 188.
Question: Concerning relations with Communist China, which of the
following would you think the best?
Answer: Remain intact 10%
Promote friendlier relations 35 
Normalize relations 34
Keep out 8
Others or don*t know 22
No answer 1
47. Asahi Shimbun, January 5, 1969.
Question: Some people say that JapanTs economic prosperity in the
postwar period depends upon the American protection of 
Japan. Do you approve or oppose this?
Answer: Approve 55%
Oppose 26
Others 6
No answer 13
48. Ibid.
Question: Do you think that the U.S. soldiers and bases in Japan
are necessary or unnecessary to protect Japan today?
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Unnecessary 56
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49. Ibid•
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No, they won*t 51
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No answer 19
50. Mainichi Shimbun, July 1, 1968.
Question: Do you, or do you not think that the Self-Defence Forces
are necessary’?
Answer: Necessary 82%
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Others 3
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53. Japan, Ministry of International Trade and Industry?, Japanese 
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from the Korean Mar.
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(ed.), The HIT Press, Cambridge, Hass. (1967).
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No. 67/4.
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national Trade and Industry: J. Iloshijina, C. Kisutani, 3. Oya, IT.
Inagaki, H. Ikeda, S. Takase, R. Yokoo, R. Takakashi, S. Ogasawara, 3. 
Okano, IT. Aichi, T. Ishibashi, II. Misuta, 3. Maeo, T. Takasaki, II. Ishii,
E. Shiina, II. Fukuda, Y. Sakurauchi, T. Iliki, M. Sugano, and II. Ohira§ 
twenty-two Directors General of the Rational Defence Agency: 3. Yoshida,
A. ITimura, 3. Hinura, A. Cugihara, -3. Sunada, II. Funada, T. Ishibashi, H. 
Kotaki, J. Tsushima, G. Sato, 3. Ino, M. Akagi, II. Esaki, IT. ITishimura,
S. Fujieda, IT. Shiga, T. Fukuda, J. Koizumi, Y. Mat sumo to, E. Kambayashi- 
yama, IT. Masuda and IT. Arita.
29. Marren Tsuneishi, Japanese Political Style, Harper and Ron7 
Publishers, New York. (1966), p. 49; and Robert Yard, Japanese Political 
System, Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N .J .  (1967), pp. 95-5.
30. Takeshi Ishida, “Yoron to Gaiko Seisaku." (Public Opinion and 
Foreign policy-IIaking), Sek.ai, July 1967, p. 37.
31. R.B. Farrell, on. cit», p. 170.
32. Ibid., p. 161.
33. Junsei Ilisawa, _on. cit., p. 31.
34. For exanple, a large number of Canadians (46!4) were dissatisfied 
with the defence policy of the Diefenbaker Government in 1960, and a 
majority of Canadians (62k) approved nuclear weapons for the Canadian 
Forces in 1961. Although government policy had changed very little in 
reaction to these public opinion poll results, the people did not 
actively oppose the government. (For the public opinion poll results, 
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in millions of yen
Name of Company 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
ilitsubishi Nihon Heavy 
Industry
1
(87.
Shin ilitsubishi Heavy 
Industry
2
(81.5)
i
(55.0)
‘ 2 r 
(100.9)
I
(203.8)
I
(200.3)
Kawasaki Airplane 
Industry
3
(56.3)
5
(19.5)
6
(19.4)
3
(43.7)
i
(67.0)
Ishikawajina-Karima 
Heavy Industry
4
(36.3)
2
(53.1)
3
(37.9)
2
(92.4)
2
(70.2)
Ilitsubishi Shipping 
Company
5
(30.6)
Komatsu Industry 6
(26.6)
10
(16.5)
7
(21.5)
Nippon Steel 7
(25.9)
4
(24.2)
Ilitsubishi Electric
(25a)
3
(23.4)
8
(l8o7)
4
(36.6)
5
(22.5)
Fuji Heavy Industry 9
(22.0)
10 
_(17 *5)
8
(22.9)
10
_ (19.2)
Nippon Oil 10
(15.3)
10
(14*4)
Kawasaki Heavy 
Industry
4
(23«1)
6
(28.7)
itihon Hlectric
(16.6)
1
(19.3)
1
(24.8)
6
(22.5)
Sumitomo Shoji 7
05.4)
9
. (19.5)
Mitsui Shipping Co.
1
h-
»
Cn * 
CO
Co s-
/
9
(20.7)
Uraga Heavy 
Industry
9
(14.8)
Nippon Aviatronics 1
(108.1)
Hitachi Limited 4
(37.5)
Nippon Kokan 5
(22.3)
Maisuru Heavy 
Industry
9
(18.1)
Shin lie iwa 
Electric
5
(36.3)
8
(20.4)
Note: Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industry became Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industry after it nerved with Ilitsubishi Nihon Heavy 
Industry in June> 1962*
Source: Asahi Shimbun Sha> Jieitai; Appendix.
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FOOTHOTEB
(Conclusion)
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8. See footnote 49 in Part I of this paper.
S. The Gallup Report, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion,
December 31, 1969.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ON
 
01
163
B13 L I CGDAP IT Y
llaterials printed in the English Language:
Government Documents
Byers, 3.3. Canadian Foreign Policy and Selected Attentive Publics.
An Unpublished Paper Prepared for the Department of External Affairs* 
December 1967.
Canada. Doyal Comission on Government Organisation. Vol. 3. 1963.
Canada. Department of Defence Production. Deport of the Department of 
Defence Production. 1951-196S.
Canada. Department of External Affairs. Annual Deport. 1950-1969.
Canada. Department of External Affairs. Foreign Policy for Canadians--
Europe. 1970.
Canada. Department of External Affairs. External .'iffairs. 1949-1970.
Canada. Department of External Affairs. Foreign Policy for Canadians.
1970.
Canada. Department of External .Affairs. Federalism and International
Delations. I960.
Canada. Department of External Affairs. Information Division. Statements 
and Speeches. 1963-1969.
Canada. Department of national Defence. The LTiite Paoer on Defence* 1964.
Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Canada Year Booh. 1945-1960.
Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Debates. 1946-1969.
Canada. Parliament. House of Commons. Standing Committee on External
Affairs, minutes of Proceedings and Evidence. 1945-1967/60.
Canada. Parliament. Ilouse of Corxions. Standing Committee on External
Affairs and national Defence. Illnutes of Proceedings and Evidence. 
1960-1969-
Japan. llinistry of International Trade and Industry. Japanese E:rnort 
Picture. 1967.
Japan. Prime Ilinister*s Office. Statistics Bureau. Hihon Tokei Hcnhan 
(Japan Statistical Yearbooh). 1962-1969.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
U.S. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Government Section.
Political Reorientation of Jan an, dev tember 1945 to September 1948.
Uatkino, llelville II. Foreitn Cmnership and the Structure of Canadian 
Industry. The Queen's Printer* Ottana, 1968.
P O O i'.S
Lech.} J. Hurry. Pendulum of Poner. P rent ice-liall of Canada* Ltd., 
Scarborough, Ontario, 1968.
Cool:, Han say. Canada; A I'odem Study. Clar!:, Irvin and Company Ltd.,
Toronto, 1957.
Damson, P.. YacGrcgor. The Government of Canada. University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto, 1963.
Eayrs, Janes G. The Art of the Possible— Government and Foreign Policy 
in Canada. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1965.
horthem Annroaches: Canada and the Search for Peace. The
Uacl-Iillan Co. of Canada, Ltd., Toronto, 1961.
Engelnann, P.O., and Schvarts, II.A. Political Parties and the Canadian
Social Structure. Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario, 
1967.
Farrell, Barry P.. The making of Canadian Foreign Policy. Prentice-Hall 
of Canada, Scarborough, Ontario, 1969.
Gellner, John. Canada in UATO. The Pyerson Press, Toronto, 1970.
Holmes, John. The Better Part of Valour: Essays on Canadian Diplomacy.
UcC lei land and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1970.
Knapp, b'ilfrid. A History of Tar and Peace, 1939-1965. C-::£ord University 
Press, "em York, 1967.
Lindblon, Charles 2. The Policy-Yaking Process. Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
Englexrood Cliffs, K.J., 1968.
Lyon, Peyton. Canada in L'orld Affairs. Vol. 211. 1961-63. 0::foi*d
University Press, Toronto, 1968.
Hartin, Paul. Canada and the Quest for Peace. Columbia University Press, 
Ken York., "l967“. . ~
I'cLin, Jon B. Canada's Changing Defence Policy. The John Hopkins Press, 
Baltimore, 1967.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
HcNelly, Theodore. Contensorary Government of Japan. Houshton llifflin 
Conpany, Boston, 1963.
Hendel, Douslas II., Jr. The Japanese Iconic and Foreign Policy. University 
of California Press, Berh.ley and Los Ariseles, Calif., 1961.
llinifie, Janes I'. I-eacer.aI~.er or PoT.;er-l'onI;e"-: CanadaTs Bole in a
P.evolutlonai-’7 Norld. UcCleliand and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1960.
Packard, Ceor^e, Jr. Protest in Tokyo: The security Treaty Crisis of
I960. Princeton University Press, Princeton, II.J., 1966.
Pearson, Lester B. The Four Faces of Peace and International Outlook.
I-IcC lei land and Stenart Ltd., Toronto, 1954.
P.eischauer, Bdnin 0. The United States and Ja~.-an. The Vikir.3 Press, Inc.,
Net. York, N.Y., 1965.
Royama, llichio. The Asian Balance of loner: A Japanese Vien. The Institute 
for Strateyic Studies, london, 1967.
Scalapino, ?.obert, and llasurii, Junnosuke. Parties and Politics in Contemorary 
Japan. University of California Press, Berkley and Los Anseles, 1962.
Schnarts, Nildred A. Public Opinion and Canadian Identity. Pitshenry and 
Yhiteside Ltd., Scarborough, Ontario, 1967.
Cniley, Donald. The Canadian Political Nationality. Ilefhuen, Toronto, 1967.
Talnad^e, Ilarian, and Gilmore, Iris. N0PAD. Dodd, Head and Company, lies:
York, 1957.
Tsuneishi, I Jarre r. Janaitese Political Style. Harper and Ron Publishers.
Net: York, 1966.
Yard, Robert S. Japan1 s Political System. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Snglet.’ooe 
Cliffs, N.J., 1957.
TIilkinson, David 0. Comparative Porcine Delations: Prancnork and Ilethods.
Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, Calif., 1969.
Yoshida, Shiyeru. The Yoshida Lenoirs. The River side Press, Canbridye,
A J O *  J  JL ,✓ O  •
/iTticles
Barknay, Ilichael. "Atlantic Pact— Net: Ilorinons,” Saturday Nlyht, Hay 2, 1950.
Bi;:, Herbert I’. "The security Treaty System and the Japanese Nilitary- 
■ Indus trial Comple::," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 2, 
no. 2 (January 1970).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
166
Cor.de, D.H.H. "Javan’s Janus Foreign Holier," The Canadian Forun, January 
1967.
Co:*, David. "Feace-keapir.g in Canadian Foreign Policy,n An Independent 
Foreign Policy for Canada? Stephen Clarkson (ed.). McClelland and 
Stewart, Toronto, 1968.
Eayrs, Janes G. ,:The Foreign Policy of Canada,* Foreign Policies in a 
Horld of Change. J o s e p h  E. Black and Kenneth 77. Thonpson (ed.).
Harper and ?.cw, Hew Pork, 1963.
 . "In Defence of a Border," The Canadian Forun, June 1967.
  _. "The Hilitary Policies of Contemporary Canada: Principles,
Problems, Precepts, Prospects," Contemporary Canada. Richard Leach 
(ed.). Duke University Press, Durham, IT.C., 1967.
______ . "Origins of Canada * s Department of External Affairs," The Growth
of Canadian Policies in External Affairs. Hugh L. Keenleyside, et al. 
(ed.). Duke University* Press, Durham, H.C., 1960.
Granatstein, J.L. "Korad: Renew or Hot?" The Canadian Forum, June 1967.
Koines, John. "Canadian External Policies Since 1945," International 
Journal, Kill (Summer 1963).
Hood, HiIlian. "The Canadian Economy: Pm Overview," Contemporary Canada. 
Richard leach (ed.). University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1968.
Keyiits, ITathan. "Hunan Resources in Canada: Population Problems and
Prospects," Contemporary Canada. Richard Leach (ed.). University 
of Toronto Press, Toronto, I960.
Loventhal, Richard. "Diplomacy and Revolution: The Dialectics of Dispute,"
China under Kao: Politics Takes Command. Roderick HacFarquhar (ed.).
The HIT Press, Cambridge, Hass., 1967.
Mallory, J.R. "The Structure of Canadian Politics," Party Politics in
Canada. Hugh G. Thorburn (ed.). Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 
Toronto, 1963.
llorley, James TJ. "Japan*s Position in Asia, 11 Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. XVII, no. 2 (1963).
I-'earson, Lester 33. "Forty Years On: Reflections on Our Foreign Policy,"
International Journal, vol. XXII (Summer 1970).
_______ . "A Hew Kind of Peace Force," Haclean*s, May 2, 1964.
Reford, Robert. "Merchant of Death?" Behind the Headlines, vol. XXVII, 
no. 4 (October 1968).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Held, Escott. "The Birth of the I-Torth Atlantic Alliance*" International 
Journal* vol. XXII (furrier IS67).
 ;_____ . "Canada and the North Atlantic Alliance)" Behind the Headlines)
vol. XXVII (June 1S5S).
Reikhoff, Harold von. "NATO: To Stay or Hot to Stay)" An Indc^endent
Foreign Policy for Canada? Stephen Clarkson (ed.). McClelland and 
Stewart Ltd.* Toronto, 1S6S*
Scalapinoj Robert A. "The Foreign Policy of Modem Japan*" Foreign Policy 
in Horld Politics. Roy C. Macridis (ed.). Prentice-Hall) Inc.* 
Englewood Cliffs* N.J., 1S67.
Seki) Yoshihiko. "The Foreign Policy of Japan," Foreign Policies in a Morld 
of Change. Joseph E. Black and Kenneth Thompson (ed.). Harper and 
How, New York* 1S63.
Steele, Janes. "Canada’s Vietnam Policy: The Diplomacy of Escalation,"
An Independent Foreign Policy for Canada? Stephen Clarkson (ed.). 
McClelland and Stewart Ltd., Toronto, 1968.
Stewart, '.'alter. "Proudly Me Stand the ’Butcher’s Helper’ in Southeast 
Asia," Maclean’s, March 1970.
Swanson, Roger F. "The United States as a National Security Threat to 
Canada," Behind the Headlines, vol. XXIX, nos. 5-6 (July 1S70).
Made, Mason. "The Roots of the Relationship," The United States and Canada 
John 3. Dickey. Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cl lifi. ) 1^ • J 1964.
Uarnock, John. "Canada and North American Defence," Alliances and Illusion 
Canada and the NATO-NOR AD Question. H.G. Hurting Ltd., Publishers, 
Edmonton, 1969.
Periodicals
Aslan Survey. 1965-1S7C.
The Canadian Forun. 1965-1970.
Japan: Socialist Review. 1962-1965.
Maclean’s. 1967-1970.
The Military Balance. 1960-1970.
The Strategic Purvey. 1960-1970.
TIME .(Canadian edition). 1969-1970.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
16S
Newspapers
The Globe and Nail.
The Ilevj York Tines.
The Toronto Telegran.
The '.'incisor Star.
Materials printed in the Japanese Language:
Government Docunonts
Japan. Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Enterprise Bureau. 
Gaishi-kei Kigyo: Sono Jittai to Eihvo (Foreign Enterprises: Their
Reality and Influence). I960.
Eooks
A~ipo to Jieital (The Security Treaty and the Self-Defence Forces). Mainichi 
Shinbun Sha, Tokyo, 1969.
Jieitai (The Self-Defence Forces). Asahi Shinbun Sha, Tokyo, 1969.
Iric, Acira. Nihon no Gaiko (The Foreign Policy of Japan). Chuokoron Sha, 
Tokyo, 1966.
Jiyu-Uinshuto (The Liberal Der.ocratic Farty). Nichi-Bei Anpo Talsei Kenji 
no Ilitsuyosel (Necessity of Maintaining the Japan-U.J. Security Treaty 
Systen). Printing Bureau of the Party, Tokyo, 1967.
Kajima, Morinosuke. Nihon no Helwa to An sen (Peace and Security of Japan). 
Kajirsa Iienkyujo, Tokyo, 1969.
Kiroku: Kokkai An; o Ronso (Report: Debates on the Security Treaty in the
House of Representatives). Vol. II. Yoniuri Shinbun Sha, Tokyo, I960.
Nikon no Cuntai--Jieitai (Japan’s Amed Forces--Self-Defence Forces). Nihon 
Kyosanto Chuo Iinkai, Tokp'o, 1967.
Onori, Minoru. Kaon ni Tsutsu Mareta Nihon (Japan in Flaring Danger).
Tokuna Shoten, Tokyo, 1960.
Sato, Minoru. Nihon no Boei Sckusen (The Defence Policy of Japan). Jiyu 
Kokunin Sha, Tokyo, IS68.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
169
Suzuki, Yul:io. Gendai Nihon no Ker.ryoku Erito (The Power Elite in Present 
Japan). Bancho Shobo, Tokyo, 1967.
Usui, Yoshini (ed.). dnpo': 1960 (The Security Treaty of I960), Tsukuna
Shobo, Tokyo, 1969.
Yoshida, Sliigeru. ITihon o Kettei Shita Kyaku-nen (JapanTs Decisive Century)• 
ITihon Keisai Shinbun Sha, Tok.yo, 1967.
Articles
Ando, Ryoichi. "Sono Yo no Kokkai o llokugaki Shite" (Yitnessing the Diet 
Procedure that Night), Anpo; 1960. Yoshini Usui (ed.). Tsuk.una 
Shobo, Tokyo, 1969.
Ashida, Ilitoshi. "Kertpo wa Yishukan de Dekitaka?” (Symposium: Yas the
Constitution nade in two weeks?), Idaigo, Special Issue, 1952.
Kisasuni, Tadao. "Anson Ilosho Rongi ni Ckeru Okinawa Ilor.dai" (The
Question of Okinawa in the Security Treaty). An sen Ilosho to ITichi- 
Bei Kankei (The Security Treaty and the Japanese-.''nerican Delations). 
Kokumin Kosa: ITihon no Anson Ilosho linkai (ed.). Hara Shobo, Tokyo, 1968.
Ishida, Takeshi. "Yoron to Gaiko Seisaku" (Public Opinion and Foreign 
Policy), Sekai, July, 1967.
llakiucb.i, llasao. l!Kaku Scito no Boei Seisaku" (The Defence Policy of
Each Party). 1970-nen Ilondai (Problens of the Year 1970). Kokunin 
Kosa: ITihon no An sen Ilosho linkai (ad.). Para Shobo, Tokyo, 1968.
liasuni, Junnosuke. "Jininto no Soshiki to Kino" (The Structure and Function 
of the Liberal Democratic Party), ITenpo: Sei i ipaku, 1967, Iwanani
Shoten, Tok.yo (1967).
llisava, Junsei. "Seisaku Kettei Katei no Gaikan" (Outlook of the Folicy-
llaking Process), Kenpo: Seijipaku, 1967, Iwanani Shoten, Tokyo, 1967.
Okazaki, Katsuo. "Gyosei Kyotei no Jittai o Tsuku" (Talk on the Truth of 
the Administrative Agreement), Kaiso, Special Issue (April 1952).
Ono, Yoshihiko. "Konnichi no Teikoku-shugi Ilujun to llichi-3ei Kankei" 
(Contradictory Imperialism Today and Japanese-American Relations),
Sekai, August 1962.
Yasuba, Yacukichi. "Anerika Tai-ITichi Keizai Gaiko: 1945-1965" (U.S.
Economic Diplomacy Towards Japan: 1945-1965). hichi-Dei Kankei no
Kenkyu (The Study of Jap-anese-American Relations). Tal:agi Hasshaku 
(ed.). Vol. 1. Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan-Kai, Tokyo, 1968.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Periodicals
Asahi Janaru (Asalii Journal). 1961-1070.
Asahi Iler.han (Asahi Year Door.). 1962-1969.
Doci Ilenhan (Defence Year Door). 1969.
Jieitai Yer.Yan (Self-Defence Year DooL:). I960.
Kaiso. 1965-1953.
Kohlcai Denran (Handbook of the Diet). 1966-1963. 
Ilainiclii lienh.an (Ilainiclii Year Booh). 1965-1969. 
ITihon Yanh.ai lleikan. 1966.
.Sekai. 1961-1970.
newspapers
Asahi Shinbun.
Ila in ic h .i Jh.ir.ibun.
Yor.iuri Shir.ibun.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171
VITA AUCTORIS
KIBOUU ICATC was born in Japan on June 1, 1942, in 
the city of Soka, just north of Tokyo. One of four 
sons of Hr. and Ilrs. Shoichi Kato of Soka, Japan, 
he studied Lav? at Taseda University in Tokyo and 
obtained his Bachelor of Arts depree there.
Follov?in3 his study of English at the 
American Language Institute in San Francisco, he 
entered the University of Toronto for a nake-up 
year and, in 1969, v?as enrolled in the Faculty of 
Graduate Studies at the University of Uindsor.
He married Carol Arikado, a Japanese Canadian, 
in June 1970.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
